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1.1 Introduction and Research Question 
Conservation of wildlife inside Africa’s national parks and reserves typically depend 
on the surrounding areas acting as dispersal areas for wild animals (Newmark & 
Hough 2000:586; Thompson & Homewood 2002:109). However, residents living in 
these areas usually suffer severe costs from wildlife conservation. They are excluded 
from using protected areas, their crops and livestock are eaten by wild animals, and 
they are barred from utilising wildlife resources (Archabald & Naughton-Treves 
2001:135; Hackel 1999:728). 
 This situation also applies to people who live close to protected areas in Kenya 
(Gibson 1999:143). In the areas bordering the world-famous Maasai Mara National 
Reserve (MMNR) local communities receive few benefits from wildlife conservation. 
While the MMNR generates significant tourism revenues, these incomes are largely 
appropriated by state bodies, private entrepreneurs and local elites (Thompson & 
Homewood 2002:133).  
In the recent years large parts of communal land have been subdivided in the 
areas around the MMNR (Lamprey & Reid 2004:998; Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:1). 
It was widely expected that this privatisation of land in the Mara1 would make 
individual landowners intensify agricultural and livestock production, leading to a 
gradual loss of wildlife abundance and diversity in the area (Lamprey & Reid 
2004:998; Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:1; Thompson & Homewood 2002:130). 
                                              
1I use the term “the Mara” to denote the areas that are located within the Greater Mara Ecosystem, including both the 
Maasai Mara National Reserve and the group ranches that surround it. 
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 Contrary to expectations, landowners in several locations close to the reserve 
have attempted to pool their land together and establish wildlife conservancies2 
(Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:9). Olare Orok Conservancy (OOC) is so far the only 
successful wildlife conservancy on private land in the areas around the MMNR. 
Studying how it was formed can give valuable insights to other actors who are trying 
to establish wildlife conservancies in the Mara.   
 My research question in this thesis is: What explains the establishment of 
Olare Orok Conservancy?  
 Agrawal and Gibson (1999:637) note that the establishment of institutions in a 
community is the result of local-level processes. Individuals with different interests 
negotiate over the management of resources. Libecap (1989:11) argues that to 
understand the formation of social institutions we must identify the parties involved, 
their interests and resources. Thus recognising the political nature of institutional 
development in the community we can specify the research question: Which actors 
influenced the establishment of the OOC? What interests did they have in the 
establishment of the conservancy? And which resources did they use to further their 
interest in the institutional creation process?  
 However, all local interactions take place within the context of larger social 
forces. New institutions are created within a world that is already replete with 
institutions. This institutional setting shapes decision-making processes in the 
community (Agrawal and Gibson 1999:637). Existing institutions are not neutral 
arenas, but power structures that give some actors greater leverage than others in the 
development of new institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996:954). Taking into account the 
influence of the institutional setting on institutional development we can ask: How 
did the institutional setting influence the interaction among actors in establishing the 
OOC? 
                                              




 To study how the institutional setting influences institutional development in 
the community we must trace social processes over time (Pierson & Skocpol 
2002:10). Institutional decisions made in the past influences which options are 
possible in the present. The path dependence of historical processes greatly 
influences the kind of social institutions that can be adopted at any time (Libecap 
1989:116; Pierson & Skocpol 2002:10).  
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
There are several possible theoretical approaches to study the establishment of 
wildlife conservancies in the Mara.  
Conservationists frequently apply the concept of “community-based 
conservation” (CBC) to study the participation of local communities in wildlife 
management. The CBC-approach argues that communities will use resources more 
sustainably if they are involved in and benefit from the management of resources 
(Agrawal & Gibson 1999:633). While this vision of community as the centrepiece of 
conservation certainly is attractive, it fails to recognise the intra-group conflicts in the 
community that affect conservation outcomes. 
 Environmental economists often focus on the role of property rights in natural 
resource management. Property rights theories assume that private property rights are 
desirable for efficiency and conservation reasons, and emerge spontaneously in 
response to population growth, agricultural commercialization and technological 
progress (Heltberg 2002:199; Platteau 2000:83-85). While the property rights 
approach duly draws attention to the significance of property arrangements in natural 
resource management, it ignores the role of the state, the impact of social capital and 
the distributive effects of institutional change in its analysis of property rights 
changes (Baland & Platteau 1998:647; Platteau 2000:112). 
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1.2.1 New Institutionalism 
Both approaches considered above fail to recognise the role of politics in institutional 
development and have an ideological bias in their analysis of natural resource 
management. I find neo-institutionalism to be a more useful approach to study the 
establishment of wildlife conservancies in the Mara as it draws attention to how 
individuals with different interests and resources interact to create institutions and 
how the institutional setting influences individual action. 
There are several different varieties of new institutionalism within the social 
sciences (Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 2005; Scott 2001; Vatn 2005). I have chosen to 
utilise two complementary versions of new institutionalism: rational choice 
institutionalism and historical institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism 
focuses on the conscious design of institutions by rational individuals, while 
historical institutionalism draws attention to how historical changes in the 
institutional setting influences which institutional options are available to individuals 
(Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 2005). Thus they provide useful tools to answer my 
research questions. 
1.2.2 Operationalisation 
As described above I will use rational choice institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism to study the establishment of wildlife conservancies in the Mara. 
Below I specify further how I intend to explain the establishment of Olare Orok 
Conservancy was. 
 To trace historical changes in the institutional setting in the Mara, I utilise the 
concept of path dependence. The basic idea of path dependence is that decisions 
made in the past continue to influence the alternative actions that are available in the 
future. Once actors choose an institutional path, self-reinforcing processes makes it 
increasingly difficult to change or reverse the direction. Only critical events may alter 
the path (Pierson & Skocpol 2002:10).  
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 To analyse the interaction among landowners in establishing Olare Orok 
Conservancy I apply the concept of “contracting”. Contracting refers to the efforts by 
individuals and groups to assign or modify social institutions (Libecap 1989:4). At 
the local level contracting involves bargaining among group members to adopt or 
change group rules regarding allocation, use and management of resources. In order 
to understand the interaction among different actors in establishing the conservancy 
we must identify the actors who were involved, determine their interests and 
resources, and assess the contextual factors that influence their choices. 
 The literature on the Mara provides a starting point to identify which actors 
influenced the establishment of the OOC. Thompson & Homewood (2002:117) 
identify four groups of actors that are central to resource management decisions in the 
Mara: i) group ranch members, ii) local elites, iii) district/national elites, and iv) 
external entrepreneurs. Based on my fieldwork I revised these categories and ended 
up with four groups of actors that influence the establishment of the OOC: i) ordinary 
landowners, ii) young landowners, iii) local elites, and iv) tourism entrepreneurs3. 
 The interests that guided actors in the establishment of Olare Orok 
Conservancy likely depended on how they viewed their welfare under the proposed 
institutional model. Actors assess their expected welfare under new institutional 
arrangements by weighing the costs and benefits associated with different 
institutional options in the light of societal norms and expectations about future 
benefits (Ostrom 1990:193; Ostrom et al. 1994:29). 
 All actors possess resources that can be used to further their private interests in 
the establishment of institutions. Resources may include material wealth, social status 
and networks, information, knowledge and skills. Some actors have greater access to 
resources than others, giving them more leverage in institutional creation processes. 
The level of resources available to different actors is often highly dependent on the 
institutional setting (Ostrom 1990:198). 
 14 
1.2.3 Definitions 
It is necessary to define a few terms to avoid confusion and present a clear 
explanation of the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy. Key terms that need to 
be defined are: “institutions”, “power” and “community”.  
By “institutions” I understand “the rules of the game” in a society, or the 
formal and informal constraints that shape human interaction (North 1990:3). 
Institutions reduce uncertainty and provide a structure to everyday life by giving 
individuals stable expectations about the behaviour of others (Ibid:3). 
 The very use of the concept “power” as an analytical tool has implications for 
how we conceptualise social reality (Lukes 2005:14). In this study I apply a relational 
concept of power according to which “A exercises power over B when A affects B in 
a manner contrary to B’s interests” (Ibid:30).  
Lukes argues that this concept of power has three dimensions. The first 
dimension is related to the study of observable conflicts between organised interests 
over concrete political issues (Ibid:17). Lukes’ second dimension concerns the power 
of actors to define the agenda and prevent other actors from voicing their interests in 
the decision-making process (Ibid:23). His third dimension studies the hidden forces 
that constrain the agenda by shaping people’s perceptions and preferences in such a 
way that they accept the existing order of things (Ibid:28).  
 While Luke’s first dimension of power illustrates how rational actors bargain 
to further their interests, his last two dimensions can be taken as an effort to highlight 
how institutional structures influence power relations in the community (Hall & 
Taylor 1996:940). The institutional setting systematically influences the distribution 
of power in society, how it is exercised, enforced and legitimated (Goverde et al. 
2000:10).  
                                                                                                                                           
3 The four categories of actors that influence the establishment of the OOC are described in chapter 4.2.1. 
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In the conservation literature, the term “community” is often used to refer to a 
group of people with three characteristics: i) located within a (small) spatial unit, ii) 
homogenous social structure, and iii) common interests and norms (Agrawal & 
Gibson 1999:633). My use of the term “community” applies the first criteria of 
spatiality, but departs from the conservationists on the last two issues. I see 
communities as made up of multiple actors with different interests, who often are in 
conflict with each other. 
1.3 Background 
1.3.1 Study Area 
Olare Orok Conservancy is located on Koyiaki group ranch4 in Narok district, south-
western Kenya. It borders the world-famous Maasai Mara National Reserve (see fig 
1), one of Kenya’s most important tourist attractions5. Koyiaki and the other areas 
bordering the MMNR are important wildlife dispersal areas, but the local residents 
receive few benefits from the tourism it generates. Landownership on Koyiaki is 
almost exclusively Maasai6. Most residents are pastoralists, while some also engage 





                                              
4 Koyiaki covers an area of 877 km2 and is home to approximately 8500 inhabitants (Thompson & Homewood 2002:115). 
5 In 2002 the Maasai Mara National Reserve and surrounding areas received 231 000 visitors (Ecotourism Kenya 2006:10).   
6 However, further to the north in Narok district there has been massive in-migration by non-Maasai. According to the 1989 
census, the Maasai account for less than half of the district population (Coast 2002:84).  
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Figure 1: Maasai Mara National Reserve and neighbouring group ranches 
 
Source: Thompson & Homewood (2002:113). 
1.3.2 Wildlife Policy and Land Tenure in the Mara after 
Independence 
 Maasai Mara National Reserve was established in 1961 and excluded the local 
Maasai population from traditional grazing areas. Tourism entrepreneurs and the 
central and local government benefited from wildlife tourism in the reserve, while 
local residents received few benefits from wildlife tourism (Azumi & MacDonald 
1993:7; Lamprey & Reid 2004:1008). The ban on consumptive utilisation of wildlife 
in 1977 removed another important source of income from the local population 
(Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:6). 
 In the beginning of the 1990s, Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) created a new 
policy framework that recognised the participation of local communities in 
conservation and provided for park revenues to be shared with residents living close 
to national parks and reserves (Barrow et al. 2000:81; Honey 1999:301). This change 
in wildlife policy encouraged local residents to establish wildlife trusts and 
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successfully challenge Narok County Council (NCC) for a share of tourism revenues 
(Barrow et al. 2000:86; Lamprey & Reid 2004:1024; Thompson & Homewood 
2002:127). However, local elites misappropriated the majority of tourism revenues 
that accrued to the group ranches (Thompson & Homewood 2002:127; Lamprey & 
Reid 2004:998). 
 On several of the group ranches adjacent to the MMNR, land was subdivided 
around the year 2000 and individual titles to land were issued (Lamprey & Reid 
2004:1022; Thompson & Homewood 2002:115). The sub-division of land led to the 
exclusion of many landowners from tourism revenues and fragmentation of the 
wildlife trusts into many wildlife associations (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]). 
However, individual titles to land also created opportunities for individual 
landowners to pool their land together and establish wildlife conservancies (Norton-
Griffiths et al. 2006:9).       
1.3.3 The Establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy 
Olare Orok Conservancy was established in May 2006 when 154 local landowners 
decided to join their land together and create a private protected area7. The 
conservancy is located next to the MMNR and covers 23 000 acres of land set aside 
for wildlife conservation and tourism. Currently the conservancy is home to three 
luxury tented camps and a wide diversity of wildlife (OOC 2007). 
 Local elites saw the establishment of a wildlife conservancy on Olare Orok as 
a unique opportunity to benefit from wildlife tourism and convinced the other 
landowners to join. A group of tourism entrepreneurs who were looking for an 
exclusive wildlife viewing area were brought in to finance and operate the 
conservancy (D. Kaelo 06.03.08, I. Feyo 08.03.08 and R. Beaton 09.03.08 
[Interviews]). 
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The OOC differs from previous institutional arrangements on the group 
ranches as it is managed by a professional company and the land is leased from 
individual landowners (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 and R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interviews]).  
Currently there are no tourists in the Mara and most of the local population in 
the areas around the MMNR receive no revenues from the tourism industry. On Olare 
Orok, in contrast, landowners still receive the monthly revenues that their leases 
guarantee them (R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]).  
1.4 Method 
The quality of social research depends to a large extent on the methods that have been 
used to generate and analyse data. Below I give a short description of the research 
process and the methodological choices I have made. 
1.4.1 Research Design 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the political processes that influenced the 
establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy. A case study was the natural approach as 
it allowed me to investigate these processes within their real-life context. It helped me 
find out “why” and “how” these processes were happening (Yin 2003:13). Focusing 
on a single case allowed me to study the processes of institutional creation in the 
Mara in detail, even though my time was limited. 
 Conducting research on social processes requires a carefully considered 
research design. A main challenge when applying a case study approach is to handle 
the many possible explanatory factors. In the case of institutionalization processes in 
                                                                                                                                           
7 The conservancy has a 5-year lease agreement with the landowners who receive a rent of KES 2 000 (USD 30) per 
hectare per year (R. Beaton 08.03.08 [Interview]). The conservancy is operated by Olpurkel ltd., a professional 
management company, and Earthview ltd, an independent body, handles revenue collection (OOC 2007). 
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the Mara, many different economical, political, historical and ecological factors may 
have influenced the outcomes. 
 An important strategy in establishing analytical control is to draw on insights 
from previous research and set up a theoretical framework that can guide the data 
collection, analysis and generalization of results (Yin 2003:33). I chose to utilise an 
institutionalist framework in my analysis of the establishment of wildlife 
conservancies in the Mara. To organise the empirical variation in my case I use the 
concepts of path dependence and contracting. I apply these two concepts to tell a 
story of exclusion and conflicts over the distribution of wildlife revenue in the Mara. 
By using a different theoretical framework I could probably tell another story about 
institutional creation in the Mara. 
 My study applies a theoretical framework to organise the empirical data and 
can thus be classified as an interpretative case study (Andersen 1997:68). Like other 
interpretative studies, the aim is not to “test” any theories or to develop new theories, 
but rather to explain my case. While my findings do not contribute to the 
development of institutional theory, they can shed some light on the factors that are 
favourable to the establishment of private protected areas in the buffer zones around 
national parks and reserves in Eastern Africa. 
1.4.2 Constructing my Case 
Identifying and constructing “the case” is often a key part of the research process 
(Andersen 1997:55). I chose to explore the establishment of wildlife conservancies in 
the Mara, because their creation conflicted with expectations that the Maasai would 
develop their land individually after it had been subdivided. Olare Orok Conservancy 
was singled out as a study object because it is an example of a successful institution 
that provides the local population with a fair share of revenues. Thus, the creation of 
the OOC is not representative for institutionalisation processes in the Mara in general, 
but rather a “best practise” that can give valuable insights to the actors who are trying 
to establish more conservancies in the area around the MMNR. 
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1.4.3 Data Collection 
Case studies typically rely on multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) to provide 
a holistic and thorough understanding of the social phenomenon under scrutiny. By 
using converging evidence from different data sources, the findings in a case study 
are likely to be more convincing and accurate (Yin 2003:98). In my study of the 
establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy I mainly use data from two sources: 
interviews and literature. 
1.4.3.1 Fieldwork 
In the period between 18th February and 27th March 2008 I carried out fieldwork in 
Kenya. I was based in Nairobi for most of the period, but also spent 10 days in the 
Mara. 
 The fieldwork was originally intended to start at the beginning of January 
2008, but was postponed for 6 weeks due to the post-election violence in Kenya. 
While the security situation had improved when I arrived in Nairobi, it still limited 
my movement during my first weeks in the country. The tense political situation also 
made it more difficult to secure interviews with government officials and politicians, 
as they were involved in reconciliation and reconstruction processes. 
Finding informants 
My first task after arriving in Nairobi was to locate informants that could provide me 
with information about the development of wildlife conservancies in the Mara. In the 
previous months I had e-mailed several NGOs and government agencies, but only 
one research institution replied. 
 The process of finding informants was characterised by a snowball effect. I 
started by interviewing two researchers at International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI) in Nairobi with thorough knowledge of the Mara. These researchers gave me 
the names of other informants, who in turn gave me the names of yet more 
informants.  
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 NGO and government officials in Nairobi declined to be interviewed on the 
grounds that they “knew too little about the local situation in the Mara”. 
Consequently, I decided to travel to the Mara and interview the local actors. In Narok 
town I interviewed Dickson Kaelo, who had previously worked for ILRI as a 
community facilitator. He became my key informant and gave me valuable 
information and contacts.  
My informants include actors with interests in the creation of wildlife 
conservancies in the Mara such as landowners, local elites, tourism entrepreneurs and 
conservationists. Distribution of wildlife revenues is a highly political issues and I 
have therefore tried to interview representatives from different sub-clans and political 
factions in the community.  
Many of my informants are close to the political processes in the Mara and 
some had key roles in the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy. Interviewing 
key actors in a political process is a strength as they can provide valuable information 
about the phenomenon I study. However, this strategy also contains pitfalls as the 
actors’ proximity to the political processes influence the information I get from them 
(Rubin & Rubin 1995:65-71). 
A significant part of my analysis is based on information from two key 
informants that played a central role as facilitators in the establishment of Olare Orok 
Conservancy. Both informants have been characterised as balanced and trustworthy 
by a number of other informants representing different groups and interests. The 
information I obtain from them has also been corroborated by other sources.  
There are several weaknesses in my selection of informants. First, I was not 
able to secure interviews with central and local government officials. This may have 
led me to underestimate the influence of the government on the distribution of 
wildlife revenues and establishment of wildlife conservancies. However, I have tried 
to compensate for this weakness by accessing newspaper articles that carry interviews 
with government officials about community conservation and tourism revenue 
sharing. 
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 Second, a majority of my informants in the community belong to the Maasai 
elite. While these informants are very knowledgeable about the political processes 
that have taken place in the community, they also have specific interests in these 
processes. By relying on information from elites I may exaggerate their importance in 
institutional creation and overlook the role of ordinary landowners. 
Finally, all my informants are male. The Maasai community is dominated by 
men and the individuals who had the closes knowledge of the creation of the OOC 
were all male. By excluding women from my pool of informants I may have 
overlooked the informal influence that women can have on the political processes in 
the Maasai community. However, my time in the Mara was not sufficient to gain 
access to the informal arenas where women gather.  
Conducting interviews 
I interviewed a total of 25 informants in the course of my fieldwork8. The interviews 
were carried out in Nairobi, in Narok town and on Koyiaki and Siana group ranches 
in the Mara.  
 I contacted my informants in Nairobi by e-mail and phone, and booked 
meetings in advance. In the Mara I used my assistant to call the informants and make 
appointments, as he knew the area well and often knew the informants personally. On 
several occasions we would turn up in a village only to find that our informant had 
gone somewhere else. Sometimes we would drive in pursuit of the informant, on 
other occasions we would ask to talk to other people in the community who were 
familiar with the same issues.  
 The interviews were conducted as loosely structured conversations. I opened 
the interviews by asking open-ended questions in order to leave the informants as free 
as possible to give their own account of the events that had taken place. By using this 
strategy I reduced the risk that interviewees would be influenced to answer in a 
                                              
8 See Annex 1: List of informants. 
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certain way. Towards the end of the interview I would steer the conversation onto 
topics of special interest and ask more detailed questions. 
 All but two interviews were conducted in English. Conducting interviews in 
English greatly eased the collection of data as I did not have to rely on an interpreter 
to translate questions and answers correctly. It also made it easier to “connect” with 
the informants and get a richer description of events. My assistant provided 
translation for interviews with two landowners who did not speak English. I have 
previously lived in Kenya and visited Maasailand on several occasions through my 
line of work. Knowing Kenyan (and Maasai) customs and a bit of Swahili greatly 
reduced the cultural barriers that potentially could have made communication 
difficult. 
The interviews took place in a variety of surroundings including offices, 
restaurants, cars, road-side pubs, bus stages, family homes, and under acacia trees on 
the savannah. I tried to ensure that interviews were conducted privately, but on 
several occasions neighbours, friends or family members of the informant listened in. 
This may have caused informants to hold back information about controversial 
topics. 
 My driver and assistant had previously worked for ILRI as a research assistant 
and was recommended as a trustworthy person. Two days into my stay in the Mara I 
discovered that he had pulled out of the very conservancy I was studying. His 
defection from the OOC did not, however, pose a serious problem to my research. As 
a rule he was not present during the interviews and only on one occasion did his 
status as a defector result in negative reactions from an informant. This negative 
incident was outweighed by the information he could provide about discontent 
among young landowners in the conservancy. He also put me in contact with other 
young landowners who shared their experiences. 
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1.4.3.2 Secondary sources 
Secondary sources were mainly collected through internet and library catalogue 
searches during early phases of the research process in Norway. Some documents and 
reports were also acquired during my fieldwork in Kenya. My secondary sources 
include books, peer-reviewed journal articles, newspaper articles, conference reports, 
funding proposals, land-use plans and official documents. 
 Maasai Mara National Reserve is one of the most famous wildlife reserves in 
the world and a great number of academic articles have been written about the 
reserve. Most of these sources describe developments in the Mara from an ecological 
point of view. My interest is in the people living close to the reserve and much less 
has been written about them. However, more articles describing the economical and 
political processes in the local communities have emerged lately. Scholars have 
realised that successful conservation of biodiversity around parks and reserves 
depends on the land-use choices of people living in these areas.  
 In the beginning I relied on newspaper articles for information about recent 
developments in land tenure and wildlife policy in the Mara, as I judged them to be 
relatively balanced and trustworthy. However, during my fieldwork I realised that 
articles published in these two newspapers did not give an accurate picture of 
developments in the Mara9. In the end I decided to only use newspaper articles as 
sources when the content can be corroborated by personal interviews or peer-
reviewed articles. 
1.4.4 Data Analysis 
Analysing case study evidence is difficult because there are no well-defined strategies 
or procedures that can be used. However, a general recommendation is to rely on 
theoretical propositions in the analysis and build explanations that explain the case 
                                              
9 Examples of poor journalistic standards include an article from the Daily Nation describing a planned wildlife 
conservancy on Siana group ranch (Daily Nation 2004) and an article in the Standard that presents sharing of tourism 
revenue in the Mara entirely from the perspective of Narok County Council (Standard 2005d). 
 25
(Yin 2003:111-120). This is what I have done in my analysis of the establishment of 
the OOC. 
After returning from my fieldwork, I started writing out my research data as a 
chronological story covering developments in wildlife policy, land tenure, tourism 
and the local institutional setting in the time between Kenyan independence and 
today.  
As a second step, I reorganised the text based on the concepts of path 
dependence and contracting. First, I identified the events that most critically 
influenced power relations in the community and rewrote my historical data to focus 
on these events and their consequences. Then I rewrote my account of the 
establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy to highlight the interests and resources of 
the different actors who were involved in the institutional creation process. 
 My third step was to write an analytical text that cultivated the use of path 
dependence and contracting to analyse the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy. 
In this text I identify the critical historical events, specify which institutional paths 
were chosen and describe how these institutional paths were self-reinforcing. I also 
identify the actors who influenced the creation of Olare Orok Conservancy, specify 
their interests and resources and describe how they created alliances to further their 
interests in the institutional creation process.  
1.4.5 Validity and Reliability 
Validity and reliability are two important indicators of the quality of social research. 
Qualitative research has been accused of being subjective by nature, but there are 
several ways to ensure validity and reliability of qualitative data. 
Validity refers to whether research findings really reflect the social 
phenomenon that is studied (Kvale 1997:165). In other words, do the data I have 
collected really explain the establishment of wildlife conservancies in the Mara? 
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 One of the steps I took to ensure valid data was to carefully specify my 
research question and discuss this operationalisation with key informants. In this way 
I made sure that my questions made sense to my informants and that their answers 
reflected important aspects of the phenomenon I wanted to study. 
 Another strategy I utilised to ensure data validity was to use multiple methods 
and data sources. By coupling evidence from different actors in the local community 
with information from documents and peer-reviewed articles my findings became 
more precise and trustworthy. 
 Finally, by applying a theoretical framework I could establish causal 
relationships and substantiate that the causes I identify really lead to the 
consequences I specify. 
 Reliability refers to whether research findings are consistent and free from 
biases and errors (Yin 2003:37). If another investigator carried out a case study of the 
establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy and followed exactly the same procedures, 
would he find the same results? 
 Reliable research is conducted in a way that is transparent and open to 
scrutiny. In my research I make conscientious references to my sources of 
information to enable other scholars to assess the quality of my data. My list of 
references provides information about where to access the written documents I have 
utilised. Interviews are listed with names and location, and informants can be 
contacted to verify the data. The methods I used to collect and analyse data are also 
described in detail. Thus I have constructed a “chain of evidence” (Yin 2003:105) 
that allows an external observer to follow the research process from initial research 
questions to the final conclusions of my study. 
1.4.6 Research Ethics   
All research on social phenomenon pose ethical challenges that need to be 
considered. Both the nature of the research process and the results that are published 
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may have possible implications for the people who are being studied. As researchers, 
our concern for the well-being of our respondents should always be more important 
than our yearning for good data. 
 Scholars generally agree on three ethical guidelines in qualitative research: 
informed consent, confidentiality, and “do no harm” (Kvale 1997:66; Thaagard 
2003:22). I had to consider all three guidelines in my research on the establishment of 
wildlife conservancies in the Mara. 
 The principle of informed consent is an ethical minimum standard in all 
research. It implies that participation in research should be voluntary and respondents 
should be informed about the aim of the research project and how research data will 
be used (Thagaard 2003:23; Kvale 1997:67). I informed all my respondents that I was 
writing a master’s thesis on the establishment of wildlife conservancies in the Mara, 
both when making appointments and at the start of each interview.  
 A second ethical guideline is the principle of confidentiality. As a general rule, 
confidentiality implies not publishing information that can reveal the identity of 
informants. To disclose the identity of an informant a researcher should have the 
informants consent (Kvale 1997:68). At the beginning of each of my interviews I told 
my informants that they could stay anonymous if they did not wish to have their 
names and details published in my thesis. In a few cases, informants gave information 
that I thought could put them in a difficult situation, such as allegations about 
corruption among community leaders. On these occasions I asked my informants 
again if they wished to remain anonymous if I used the information. Several of my 
informants argued that they wanted this information to be made public and saw no 
reason to remain anonymous if I published it. 
 A third ethical guideline is that researchers should do no harm through their 
research. In its weak form this principle implies that research subjects should suffer 
no physical or psychological harm (Thagaard 2003:26). Some scholars go further and 
argue that respondents’ advantages from the research should outweigh their 
disadvantages (Kvale 1997:69). In the Mara many community members are tired of 
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researchers who spend hours of their time and give nothing back. Research results 
seldom reach the community who could benefit from them. 
 I tried to make my research benefit the local community in several ways. As a 
start, my thesis raises awareness about the exclusion of the Maasai from tourism 
revenue and analyses which conditions are favourable to the establishment of wildlife 
conservancies that benefit the local landowners. I will send the thesis to my 
informants by e-mail and also plan to bring a number of printed copies when I return 
to Kenya in July 2008.  
My fieldwork in the Mara also benefited the local community in a more 
tangible way. I rented a car from one of the local landowners and paid another 
landowner to be my driver and assistant. Wherever we went in the area we would 
pick up passengers on our way. Finally, I stayed at an eco-camp that is recognised for 
supporting the local community.  
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
In this chapter I have introduced the topic and case of my study, specified my 
research questions, presented a theoretical framework to study these questions and 
described the methods I follow to collect and analyse data. My topic is the 
establishment of wildlife conservancies in the Mara and I use Olare Orok 
Conservancy as a case because it is a unique example of a successful conservancy. 
The questions I try to answer in the study are which actors influenced the 
establishment of the OOC and how the institutional setting influenced the interaction 
among these actors. I use rational choice institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism as a theoretical framework and the concepts of contracting and path 
dependence to structure the analysis of these questions. Interviews with key actors 
and literature on resource management in the Mara are my main data sources in this 
work.  
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The second chapter establishes a theoretical framework for my research. I 
introduce new institutionalism as an approach to study the establishment of wildlife 
conservancies in the Mara and discuss how institutional development and change is 
treated within rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism. I also 
construct an analytical framework based on these two versions of new 
institutionalism that use the concepts of path dependency and contracting to explain 
institutional development and change.  
In the third chapter I give an overview of the historical changes in wildlife 
policy and land tenure in the Mara since independence and describe the establishment 
of Olare Orok Conservancy. I pay special attention to how actors with different 
interests and resources influence the processes of institutional creation. 
The fourth chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part I use the concept of 
path dependence to analyse the historical changes in wildlife policy and land tenure 
that determine which institutional options are available for the local population to 
benefit from wildlife tourism. In the second part I identify which actors influenced 
the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy and how they created alliances to 
further their interests in the institutional creation process. 
In the fifth and final chapter I summarise the thesis, present my main findings, 
explain how my findings can contribute to the research field and point out some 





2. Theoretical Framework 
My aim in this study is to explain the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy by 
looking at how individuals with different interests and resources interact to establish 
the conservancy and how their interaction is influenced by the institutional setting in 
the Mara. 
There are several possible ways to approach these issues, but one way is to 
look at the establishment of wildlife conservancies from a neo-institutional 
perspective. Neo-institutionalism describes how individuals create institutions, but 
also how the institutional setting influences which actions individuals can take (Hall 
& Taylor 1996:950. Rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism 
are two versions of new institutionalism that are particularly useful to explore my 
case as they direct attention to the conscious design of institutions and the importance 
of historical processes in determining institutional development (Hall & Taylor 
1996:950; Thelen 1999:400). 
In this chapter I first give a quick overview of new institutionalism. I then take 
a closer look at historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism and 
examine how they describe the nature of institutional development and change. 
Finally, I construct an analytical framework that utilises insights from both rational 
choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism to analyse the establishment of 
Olare Orok Conservancy. 
2.1 New Institutionalism 
The term “new institutionalism” implies that there must also be an “old 
institutionalism”, that is somehow different from the new. Old institutionalism 
developed towards the end of the nineteenth century. Its scholars raised institutional 
and normative questions, and often sought to discover which institutions would work 
best, given the goals of a political system (Scott 2001:6). However, old 
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institutionalism was gradually replaced by a behaviouralist approach that tried to 
eliminate normative elements within political science (Peters 2005:12; Scott 2001:7). 
 New institutionalism developed as a reaction to the behavioural perspective 
and has tried to shift the attention of political analysis back to institutions (Hall & 
Taylor 1996:936; Peters 2005:16; Scott 2001:8). New institutionalists argue that 
institutions constrain and empower behaviour and consequently play an important 
role in the determination of economic, social and political outcomes (Hall & Taylor 
1996:936; Scott 2001:8). 
Several different varieties of new institutionalism have emerged within the 
social sciences. It is now common to distinguish three different schools of new 
institutionalism within political science10: historical institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996:936; Thelen 
1999:369).  
Some scholars argue for the wholehearted embrace of one particular version of 
new institutionalism, at the expense of others. However, each of the different schools 
of new institutionalism seem to provide a partial account of the forces at work in a 
given situation, capturing different dimensions of how human action and institutional 
settings influence social outcomes (Hall & Taylor 1996:955). No single version of 
new institutionalism can provide a complete understanding of institutional 
phenomena.  
 I have chosen to utilise insights from historical institutionalism and rational 
choice institutionalism in studying the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy.  
Rational choice institutionalism recognizes the purposive creation of institutions by 
drawing attention to the benefits they produce for their creators. Historical 
                                              
10 Other scholars identify several more varieties of new institutionalism. Scott (2001) distinguishes five varieties within 
economics, politics and sociology. Vatn (2005) identifies three different sub-branches within new institutional economics. 
Peters (2005) categorises seven different versions of new institutionalism just within political science. 
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institutionalism focuses on how choices made in the past affect the establishment of 
institutions in the present.   
Below I give a short outline of historical institutionalism and rational choice 
institutionalism and discuss how they explain institutional development and change. 
2.1.1 Historical Institutionalism 
The label “historical institutionalism” is used to describe a set of varied contributions 
within several social science disciplines (Hall & Taylor 1996:937). However, they 
share some general features, four of which will be outlined below.  
First, historical institutionalists are eclectic in their description of the 
relationship between institutions and individuals, using both the “calculus approach” 
and the “cultural approach” (Hall & Taylor 1996:940). The “calculus approach” 
views individual behaviour as instrumentalist. Individuals behave strategically to 
maximise the attainment of their goals. This the same view of human nature that we 
find in rational choice institutionalism. In contrast, the “cultural approach” does not 
see behaviour as fully strategic, but bounded by an individual’s worldview. 
Individuals turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behaviour to attain their 
purposes (Hall & Taylor 1996:939). 
 Second, historical institutionalism emphasizes asymmetric power relations and 
its impact on the development and operation of institutions (Hall & Taylor 
1996:940). Institutions are not neutral arenas where external interests compete, but 
rather complex structures with rules and procedures that generate independent 
interests and affect the business that is conducted (Scott 2001:34). Institutions 
distribute power unevenly across social groups, giving some actors disproportionate 
access to the decision-making process (Hall & Taylor 1996:941).  
 Thirdly, the most distinctive feature of historical institutionalism is its 
attention to the path dependence of historical development. The basic idea of this 
perspective is that choices made at one point in history, will have a continuing and 
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determinate influence over events in the future. When an institutional path is created 
there is a tendency for the initial choices to persist. The path may be altered, but it 
requires a critical event to produce that change (Peters 2005:71). 
 Finally, historical institutionalists are open to integrate non-institutional factors 
in the analysis of political outcomes (Hall & Taylor 1996:942). Many studies in the 
historical institutionalist literature use non-institutional variables like socio-economic 
development and diffusion of ideas to explain the adoption of policies or institutions 
(Peters 2005:75). 
2.1.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism represents an extension of new institutional 
economics perspectives of transaction costs and bounded rationality, and applies the 
same principles to the study of political institutions (Scott 2001:34). Rational choice 
institutionalism contains internal debates and variations in outlook, but below I 
present some features that are central to the approach.  
 First, rational choice theorists generally consider individuals to have a fixed 
set of preferences and to behave instrumentally in order to maximise their attainment 
of these preferences (Hall & Taylor 1996:944; Peters 2005:48; Scott 2001:35). 
Individuals behave in a highly strategic manner that requires extensive calculation. 
However, individual maximisation also leads to dysfunctional behaviour such as free-
riding and shirking (Peters 2005:50). 
 Second, institutions are established by rational individuals seeking to further or 
protect their interests (Peters 2005:48; Scott 2001:34). The primary motivation of 
these individuals is utility maximisation and they may find that they can realise their 
goals most effectively through institutions. In rational choice institutionalism, politics 
is generally defined as a series of collective action dilemmas, where individuals 
acting to maximise their own preferences produce an outcome that is collectively 
suboptimal. Institutions are then created to regulate behaviour and solve these 
collective action dilemmas (Hall & Taylor 1996:945; Scott 2001:35). 
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 Thirdly, rational choice institutionalism emphasizes the role of strategic 
interaction between actors in determining political outcomes (Hall & Taylor 
1996:945). Individual behaviour is not driven by impersonal historical forces, but by 
a strategic calculus and expectations about the behaviour of others. Institutions 
structure strategic interactions by constraining the range and sequence of alternative 
choices. They also provide information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce 
uncertainty about the behaviour of others. This provides a political space where 
interdependent political actors can function (Hall & Taylor 1996:945; Peters 
2005:48-49). 
 Finally, the formation of institutions is explained by reference to the specific 
functions that an institution performs. Actors create institutions to realize the 
functional value that it has for them, most often in terms of gains from cooperation. 
Accordingly, the institutionalization process is characterized by voluntary agreement 
by the relevant actors (Hall & Taylor 1996:945). In contrast to other models of new 
institutionalism, the rational choice perspective assumes that institutions are being 
created from scratch and that the actors are free to choose the design of their 
institution (Peters 2005:51). This assumption leaves little concern for the impact of 
history on the creation of new institutions. 
2.1.3 The Nature of Institutional Development and Change 
In order to explain the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy it is necessary to 
look closer at how these two versions of new institutionalism explain institutional 
development and change. I argue that the two perspectives complement each other in 
explaining how institutions are created and transformed.  
Within historical institutionalism, institutional change is often approached 
through the concepts of punctuated equilibriums and critical junctions (Peters 
2005:77). Institutions are seen as mainly existing in equilibrium states, punctuated by 
critical junctures in which institutional developments moves onto a new path. 
Historical institutionalism has been criticised for being more concerned with the 
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persistence of organisations than their creation (Peters 2005:76). However, some 
historical institutionalist scholars introduce the concept of self-reinforcing processes 
as an alternative way to look at path dependence (Thelen 1999:371). This approach 
combines the analysis of institutional stability and institutional change and is closer 
to rational choice institutionalism.   
Rational choice institutionalism has produced an elegant account of how 
institutions are created, focusing primarily on the functions they perform and the 
benefits they produce for their members (Hall & Taylor 1996:952). The approach is 
largely functionalist as it explains the origin of institutions in terms of the effects they 
produce. Rational choice institutionalists also assume that institutional creation is a 
purposive process, largely under the control of actors seeking to secure their interests. 
Many scholars within this school view institutional creation as a voluntary 
contracting process, where equal and independent actors agree on rules to govern 
their actions (Hall & Taylor 1996:952). 
Rational choice institutionalists have been criticised for failing to explain the 
origin of institutions and ignoring the institutional inefficiencies we observe in 
society. They have also been accused of providing simplistic accounts of the 
motivation and resources of actors and failing to recognise the influence of power 
asymmetries on political outcomes (Hall & Taylor 1996:952). 
Historical institutionalism avoids the functionalist and voluntarist “traps” that 
rational choice institutionalism falls into. While many rational choice theorists treat 
institutional creation as some kind of “tabula rasa”, historical institutionalists argue 
that new institutions are created in a world that is already replete with institutions. 
Existing institutions create power relations that give some actors more power than 
others over the development of new institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996:954).  
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2.2 Analytical Framework 
The previous section discussed two versions of new institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and historical institutionalism, and explored how these two 
perspectives view the nature of institutions. This section uses elements of the two 
perspectives to develop an analytical framework that can guide the analysis of the 
creation of Olare Orok Conservancy. 
 The first part of the analytical framework describes how historical processes 
influence the institutional choices of individuals. I apply the logic of path dependence 
and self-reinforcing processes to explain how institutional choices made in the past 
influence which institutional choices are possible to make in the present. 
The second part of the analytical framework uses the concept of “contracting” 
to specify how actors interact strategically to establish institutions. By using this 
concept we can identify how actors have different interests and use their resources to 
further their own interests in the creation of the conservancy. 
2.2.1 Tracing Historical Processes 
History matters. Historical developments strongly influence which institutional 
options are available in the present. By using the concepts of path dependency and 
self-reinforcing processes we can analyse how historical events altered power 
structures in the community and influenced which institutional options were available 
for the creators of the OOC. 
Path dependence 
The basic idea of path dependence is that decisions made in the past continue to 
influence the alternatives available in the future. In this perspective, institutional 
choices tend to have self-reinforcing consequences. Once actors establish an 
institution, they are likely to find it very difficult to change or reverse their decision. 
Political options that were once plausible, or at least possible, are no longer available 
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to the actors (Pierson & Skocpol 2002:10). Only “critical incidents” may alter the 
path. Thus, events that take place in the early stages of a historical process gain added 
importance (Mahoney 2000:510). 
Critical junctures 
With path dependence, the events and processes that take place at “critical junctures” 
are essential (Pierson & Skocpol 2002:10). Critical junctures are characterised by the 
adoption of a specific institutional arrangement. They are critical because once a 
particular institution is created it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the 
initial point when other alternatives were still available (Mahoney 2000:513). 
 In my description of the historical processes leading up to the creation of Olare 
Orok Conservancy, changes in wildlife policy and land tenure are such critical 
junctures. Changes in wildlife policy and land tenure alter power structures in the 
communities, and lead to the creation of new institutions for wildlife management. 
Self-reinforcing processes 
Self-reinforcing processes are sequences where “initial steps in a particular direction 
induce further steps in the same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or 
impossible to reverse direction” (Mahoney 2000:512). Historical institutionalists 
specify different mechanisms that produce self-reinforcement11. I base my analysis of 
self-reinforcing processes on power mechanisms as I view intra-group conflicts as an 
important feature of institutional development in the Mara.  
 Scholars who adopt “power” explanations of self-reinforcing processes 
emphasise how institutions distribute costs and benefits unevenly. Actors with 
different resource endowments will consequently have conflicting interests related to 
institutional development and change (Mahoney 2000:521). To explain how self-
reinforcing processes sustain institutional arrangements we need to identify who has 
                                              
11 The concept of “increasing returns” (North 1990) is often used to explain self-reinforcing processes.  
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invested resources in a particular institutional arrangement, how that investment is 
sustained over time and how outsiders are kept out (Thelen 1999:391). 
 Once created, institutions are reinforced through a predictable power dynamic: 
an institution initially empowers a group at the expense of others; the advantaged 
group uses its power to expand the institution; the expansion of the institution 
increases the power of the advantaged group; and so on (Mahoney 2000:521). Thus, 
self-reinforcing processes may have a crucial impact on power relations in the 
community. Initial power asymmetries of a modest character, may be reinforced over 
time and become embedded in institutions (Pierson & Skocpol 2002:10). 
 In the Mara, the establishment of group ranches may be one example of self-
reinforcing processes. The institutional rules of the group ranches concentrated power 
in the hands of the leadership, who used this power to divert a large share of group 
ranch resources to themselves, thus further increasing their power in the community.  
The idea of self-reinforcing processes may seem as an overly static view of the 
social world. However, power based accounts of path dependency do not see 
institutional reproduction as inevitable. Institutions rest on ideational and material 
foundations, and if these foundations are shaken, institutions may change (Thelen 
1999:397). Institutional development is a conflictual process and specific groups are 
disadvantaged by institutional persistence. There is always a dynamic of potential 
change built into institutions (Mahoney 2000:523).  
North (1990:98-99) also notes the limits of path dependence: “At every step 
along the way there were choices (…) that provided real alternatives. Path 
dependence (…) is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the 
future”. 
2.2.2 Analysing Institutional Development 
In my analysis of the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy it is necessary to 
move beyond the institution-as-remedy view, which is sometimes found in rational 
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choice institutionalism, and place the distributive nature of institutions at the centre of 
the analysis. Individuals vary in the amount of resources they possess and the 
institutions they construct can be exclusionary or redistributive (Gibson 1999:11). 
To describe how landowners interacted to create the OOC I borrow the 
concept of “contracting” from Libecap (1989). Contracting refers to how individuals 
and organisations bargain to change rules and customs regarding the allocation and 
use of property (Libecap 1989:4). Libecap develops a full model of property rights 
change in society, but only the part that concerns changes in the local community is 
applicable to my analysis. 
In the bargaining over creating or modifying an institution, the stands taken by 
various actors will be moulded by their private interests and expectations about the 
actions of others (Libecap 1989:4). The actors must see their welfare improved in 
order for them to support institutional change, and all actors have incentives to seek 
as large a share of rents as possible under the new institutional arrangement (Libecap 
1989:11). Individuals are also likely to choose structures that reinforce their 
bargaining and coercive power. Because of the strong distributional implications of 
institutional change, the bargaining process is likely to be divisive.  
In order to understand the political nature of institutional creation we must 
identify the actors who were involved, determine their interests and resources, and 
assess the contextual factors that influence their choices (Libecap 1989:11). These are 
key issues that will be addressed in my analysis of the establishment of the OOC. 
Identifying the actors 
A first step in an institutional analysis is to identify the actors who are involved in the 
process of institutional creation. Actors can be categorised based on their interests 
and resources, and those groups who do not have a direct influence on the 
establishment of the conservancy can be left out. 
 A starting point for identifying the relevant actors can be to look at the 
literature about natural resource management in Kenya. Thompson and Homewood 
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(2002:117) have identified four interest groups as central to resource management 
decisions in the Mara: i) group ranch members, ii) local elites, iii) district/national 
elites and iv) external entrepreneurs. Swallow and Kamara (2000:255) also identify a 
fifth group that has a strong interest in land-use decisions in Kenya: v) development 
assistance agencies and non-governmental organisations. Based on my fieldwork I 
revise these groups of actors to come up with the actors that have the greatest 
influence on the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy12. 
Determining the interests of actors 
A second step in my institutional analysis can be to determine the interests that guide 
actors in the establishment of institutions. These interests depend upon how actors 
view their welfare under the proposed institutional arrangement, as relative to other 
institutional options (Libecap 1989:11).  
How actors assess their expected welfare under a new institutional 
arrangement is dependent on the information actors have about the costs and benefits 
associated with different institutional options (Ostrom et al. 1994:29). While benefits 
include different forms of income the actor expects to receive under the new 
institutional model, costs may include the expenses associated with both setting up 
and running the new institutions (Ostrom 1990:195-8). 
In evaluating the costs and benefits of different institutional options, actors are 
affected both by societal norms and how they evaluate future benefits (discount rates) 
(Ostrom 1990:193). Norms may influence decision making, because breaking them 
can lead to personal discomfort or sanctions from the community. Discount rates may 
influence decisions if individuals attribute less value to expected benefits in the 
distant future as compared to benefits in the immediate future (Ostrom 1990:205-6). 
                                              
12 In Chapter 4.2.1 I identify four groups of actors that influence the establishment of the OOC: i) ordinary landowners, ii) 
young landowners, iii) local elites, and iv) tourism entrepreneurs. 
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The potential benefits of establishing a wildlife conservancy in the Mara may 
include incomes from leasing out land and new job opportunities in the tourism 
industry. Costs may derive from having to give up other land-uses, organising 
meetings and registering the organisation or the employment of staff to manage the 
conservation area. 
 Among the Maasai, the creation of a wildlife conservancy may be influenced 
by social norms that give high value to consensual decision-making, the opinions of 
elders and fairness in the allocation of resources. The time horizons of individual 
landowners is likely to be affected by whether they expect to continue living in the 
area and whether they see opportunities for more rapid benefits from other land uses.  
Identifying resources 
A third step in my institutional analysis is to specify the resources that different actors 
possess. Resources may include material wealth, social status and networks, 
information, knowledge and skills. The actors use these resources to further their 
private interests in the establishment of institutions. 
All actors possess some resources or means to affect a decision. However, 
some actors have greater access to resources than other, giving them greater leverage 
in institutional creation processes. The resources that are available to different actors 
are often highly dependent on the institutional setting (Ostrom 1990:198). 
In the Mara, many landowners are poor and may have limited opportunities to 
pay the costs associated with institutional formation. Many of them are also illiterate 
and may have limited access to information regarding legal and economic affairs. 
Local elites have far more resources than ordinary landowners and greater 
opportunities to influence institutional choices. 
Assessing contextual factors 
A final step is to identify the contextual factors that influence actors in their decisions 
to establish institutions. Decisions may be influenced by the contemporary 
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characteristics of the community or more long-term environmental factors (Libecap 
1989:18). Ostrom et al. (1994:37) identify three different categories of contextual 
variables that affect individual choices: i) attributes of the physical world, ii) the 
nature of the community, and iii) the institutional setting. 
 First, the institutional choices of individuals are affected by the attributes of 
the physical world. Which actions and outcomes are available, and individuals’ 
knowledge of these opportunities, may depend on physical factors (Ostrom et al. 
1994:44). In the Mara, these physical factors may include the size and location of a 
proposed conservation area, the location of settlements, the quality of the soil and the 
presence of tsetse flies in the area. 
 Second, the choices individuals make are influenced by the attributes of the 
local community. In homogenous communities where individuals interact regularly, 
norms of behaviour become a form of social capital that can advance collective action 
(Ostrom et al. 1994:45). In the Mara, differences in material endowments among 
landowners and whether a group of residents belong to the same Maasai sub-clan 
may influence the institutional choices that individuals make. 
 Finally, the institutional setting influences the choices that individuals make. 
Institutions as rules define which actions are permitted and prohibited and thereby 
constrain some actions and empower others (Ostrom et al. 1994:38). The institutional 
setting is comprised of both national and local policies and structures. In relation to 
the creation of wildlife conservancies in the Mara, individual choices may be 
influenced by national policies on wildlife and land tenure, but also by local 
traditions for decision-making on the group ranches. 
2.2.3 Summary 
In this chapter I have given a brief outline of historical institutionalism and rational 
choice institutionalism and discussed how they describe institutional development 
and change. Rational choice institutionalism views institutional development as a 
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voluntary contracting process in which individual actors seek to establish an 
institution that secures their interests. Historical institutionalists argue that new 
institutions are created in a world that is replete with institutions and that the 
institutional setting create power asymmetries that give some actors greater leverage 
than others in the development of new institutions.  
Rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism give different 
accounts of institutional development. Rather than choosing one over the other, I see 
them as complementary in understanding processes of institutional development and 
change. Taken together, the two perspectives predict that institutions will change 
when individuals see an opportunity to profit, when they possess the resources 
necessary to bring about change and when the institutional setting provides an 
opportunity for change. 
The analytical framework is based on these two versions of new 
institutionalism. It uses two main concepts to analyse institutional development and 
change. Path dependence refers to how historical events create institutional paths that 
are sustained through self-reinforcing processes. Contracting draws attention to how 
actors with different interests and resources bargain to adopt or change institutions. 
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3. Empirical Data 
In the previous chapter I discussed how the concepts of path dependence and 
contracting can be used to study how institutional development and change. The two 
perspectives describe how actors with different interests and resources interact to 
establish institutions and how their interaction is influenced by the institutional 
setting. In this chapter I describe how the institutional setting in the Mara has 
influenced which opportunities are open to landowners and how different actors have 
interacted to establish a wildlife conservancy on Olare Orok. 
The first part of this chapter traces the changes in land tenure and wildlife 
policy in the Mara since independence. It describes how these changes in the 
institutional setting alter power relations in the community and affect the ability of 
the Maasai to organise themselves to benefit from wildlife tourism. 
 The second part of the chapter describes the establishment of Olare Orok 
Conservancy. It illustrates how different actors had different motivations to establish 
the conservancy and how they influenced the institutional creation process. 
3.1 Wildlife Policy and Land Tenure in the Mara after 
Independence 
The development of wildlife policy and land tenure in Kenya is crucial to 
understanding the institutional alternatives that are available to the Maasai on the 
group ranches bordering the Maasai Mara National Reserve. Wildlife policy and land 
tenure determines the ownership of resources and thereby the authority to make 
decisions about resource use. Consequently, they critically influence power relations 
in the community, by determining the distribution of wealth among actors. 
 Below I give a short description of the development of land tenure and wildlife 
policy in the Mara during the first decades after independence. I further illustrate how 
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these institutional arrangements severely limited the ability of the Maasai to organise 
to benefit from wildlife revenues. 
3.1.1 1963-1989: The Establishment of MMNR and Introduction of 
Group Ranches 
The Kenyan government continued to pursue a colonial wildlife policy after 
independence from Britain in 1963. Conservation practises were still based on 
establishing protected areas from which local residents were excluded. The white 
minority in Kenya and later the international community continued to have a strong 
influence on wildlife policies. 
Three events had a particular impact on the institutional options that were 
available to the local Maasai population: the establishment of the MMNR, the ban on 
consumptive utilisation of wildlife, and the establishment of group ranches. 
The establishment of protected areas and shifts in wildlife policies 
National parks and reserves were established in Kenya after the end of the Second 
World War, mainly as a result of strong pressure by a small conservation lobby 
comprised of expatriates in the tourism industry (Azumi & MacDonald 1993:7; 
Gibson 1999:41). The Maasai Mara National Reserve was established in 1961 and 
Narok County Council was given the responsibility to manage the reserve on behalf 
of the local population (Lamprey & Reid 2004:1008; Rutten 2002:4).  
The local communities never participated in the establishment of the Maasai 
Mara National Reserve. The creation of the reserve excluded the Maasai from their 
traditional grazing lands and their losses were not compensated (Azumi & 
MacDonald 1993:7). It was clear to the Maasai that protected areas were created to 
benefit white Europeans, not the local community (Gibson 1999:42). 
While local communities received little revenue from wildlife tourism in the 
MMNR, another way to benefit from wildlife remained open: consumptive utilisation 
of wildlife. By the early 1970s, sports hunting had grown to become a large industry 
 46 
and an important source of income for the local communities13 (Norton-Griffiths et 
al. 2006:6). While wildlife viewing was confined to a small area close to the reserve, 
sports hunting created revenues throughout Narok district.  
At the same time, significant illegal hunting took place in Kenya and many 
politicians and bureaucrats were deeply involved in the illegal wildlife trade (Gibson 
1999:73). In an attempt to stop the poaching of wildlife and conserve biodiversity, all 
hunting was banned in 1977 under the new Wildlife Act (Kameri-Mbote2005:7; 
Mburu2004:4). The ban failed to curb poaching, but hurt the local community who 
lost a crucial source of income (Gibson 1999:74). 
The introduction of group ranches in the Mara 
Land had traditionally been held under common ownership in the Mara, but in the 
late 1960s the government introduced the concept of group ranches to the Mara 
(Azumi & MacDonald 1993:7; Rutten 2002:5). Land was sub-divided into portions 
and groups of Maasai were assigned titles to group ranches. By registering their 
members, adopting constitutions, and electing management committees, the group 
ranches could acquire loans from the government to develop shared ranch 
infrastructure such as dams and cattle dips (Lamprey & Reid 2004:999; Mwangi 
2005:8; Mwangi 2007:818). Koyiaki was one of 11 group ranches that were 
established in the Mara in the early 1970s (Lamprey & Reid 2004:1002). 
The group ranch program was an attempt by the government to increase meat 
production on the rangelands, manage the land in a more sustainable way, and 
permanently settle the nomadic Maasai (Azumi & MacDonald 1993:19; Lamprey & 
Reid 2004:999; Mwangi 2005:8; Mwangi 2007:818). Ordinary Maasai did not 
necessarily accept, or even understand, the aims of the program, but agreed as it gave 
them protection against land grabbing by in-migrants and elites (Mwangi 2005:10). 
                                              
13 Norton-Griffiths & Said (2008:3) estimate the consumptive wildlife industry to have been worth around USD 20 million 
in 1977.  
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The local elites opposed the creation of group ranches at first because their large 
cattle herds would be confined to smaller areas, but later supported the program as 
many of them were granted large individual ranches. By granting enhanced tenure 
security to ordinary Maasai and paying off the local elites with lucrative side deals, 
the government managed to push through this formalisation of land tenure in 
Maasailand. 
 The establishment of group ranches was meant to equalize power relations 
between wealthier and poorer Maasai. The Land (Group Representatives) Act 
(Republic of Kenya 1968) stated that members should have equal ownership of the 
group ranch and required that regular elections were held (Mwangi 2005:8). Contrary 
to intentions, the introduction of group ranches contributed to widen the gap between 
elites and ordinary group ranch members. Elections were seldom held and 
management committees wielded considerable power over the management of 
resources. Through social influence, insider knowledge and access to administrative 
channels, the committee members diverted a substantial amount of group ranch 
revenues into their own pockets (Azumi & MacDonald 1993:19; Lamprey & Reid 
2004:1021; Thompson & Homewood 2002:118). 
Ordinary group ranch members were dissatisfied with the corrupt group ranch 
management. Less than 10 years after the creation of group ranches members were 
calling for the dissolution of group ranches in the Mara. The sub-division of group 
ranches became official government policy in the mid 1980s, when president Daniel 
Arap Moi urged members to subdivide group ranches and develop their own pieces 
of land (Mwangi 2005:13). In the Mara, the sub-division process started in the mid 
1980s, but was stalled by protracted court battles over boundary and entitlement 
disputes (Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:8). 
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3.1.2 1989-2000: Community Conservation and the Formation of 
Wildlife Trusts 
Kenya experienced a massive increase in tourism during the 1980s. By 1988 it 
received more than 800,000 international visitors each year, bringing an estimated 
USD 350 million into the country14 (Akama 1999:6; Gibson 1999:74). More than 30 
% of these visitors passed through the Maasai Mara (Honey 1999:309). 
 Even though the overall profits from wildlife tourism in the Mara were high, 
only a small proportion of revenues reached people living on the group ranches. In 
1987, wildlife tourism generated an estimated total income of KES 445 million (USD 
42 million) in the Mara. The bulk of profits accrued to large commercial operators, 
mostly owned by white Kenyans of European origin (Earnshaw & Emerton 
2000:323). Narok County Council captured 5 % of the total income from wildlife 
tourism. The group ranches received less than 1 % of tourism revenues, most of 
which was captured by local elites (see fig. 2). 
While commercial operators seized the lion’s share of tourism revenues in the 
Mara, the local Maasai did little to challenge their control over tourism revenues. The 
Maasai lacked the skills to engage in the tourism business and the tourism 
entrepreneurs were also protected by national political elites, as tourism was an 
important source of foreign currency for the Kenyan government (Earnshaw & 
Emerton 2000:323; Gibson 1999:74). 
Instead, the group ranches turned to Narok County Council (NCC) to demand 
a greater share of tourism revenues. Narok County Council held the MMNR in trust 
for the local population, but group ranch leaders argued that local residents did not 
receive any benefits from the reserve. Tourism revenues were spent on projects 
throughout Narok district, instead of benefiting the local Maasai who paid the costs 
of having wildlife on their land (Honey 1999:311). Group ranch leaders also 
                                              
14 In 1980 Kenya received approximately 350,000 visitors, bringing USD 20 million into the country (Gibson 1999:74). 
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criticised NCC officials for engaging in massive corruption and for completely 
lacking transparency regarding the collection of revenue from the reserve15 (Azumi & 
MacDonald 1993:6; Honey 1999:312).  





















Adapted from Earnshaw & Emerton (2000:325). 
 In the early 1990s, Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) introduced a new policy of 
community participation in wildlife management, a move that would strengthen the 
position of group ranch leaders in relation to the NCC. 
The introduction of community participation in wildlife management 
The Kenyan government had largely failed to manage the nation’s wildlife during the 
1980s, but was forced to take action by pressure from foreign governments and 
                                              
15 A World Bank official estimated that the NCC was collecting between USD 1,5-2 million from MMNR per year in the 
early 1990s (Honey 1999:312). 
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international conservation organisations. In 1989 the management of wildlife was 
transferred to Kenya Wildlife Service, a new parastatal that was relatively 
independent of the government (Barrow et al. 2000:81; Honey 1999:299; Rutten 
2002:7).  
 The new director of KWS, Richard Leakey, carried out a remarkable 
transformation of Kenya’s corrupt wildlife management. By 1991 KWS had drawn 
up a new policy framework that explicitly recognised the value of community 
participation in wildlife management (Barrow et al. 2000:81; Honey 1999:301). The 
framework facilitated the formation of Community Wildlife Service (CWS) to forge 
partnerships with communities outside the parks and enable them to benefit from the 
presence of wildlife on their land (Mburu 2004:5).  
 International donors enthusiastically welcomed these changes in wildlife 
policy and lined up to contribute. USAID started the Conservation of Biodiverse 
Resource Areas project (COBRA) in 1992 to help KWS implement its new 
community conservation approach. The COBRA project aimed to conserve wildlife 
by increasing the socio-economic benefits of wildlife conservation to communities 
living adjacent to national parks and reserves (Barrow et al. 2000:23; Honey 
1999:301). One way the COBRA program tried to encourage community 
participation was by sharing 25 % of KWS revenues from gate fees with communities 
neighbouring selected parks (Barrow et al. 2000:82; Honey 1999:301; Rutten 
2002:7). This soon led to demands from communities countrywide to get a share of 
wildlife revenue in their neighbouring parks. 
Establishment of wildlife trusts in the Mara 
The changes in wildlife policy encouraged the group ranches around the MMNR to 
challenge Narok County Council for a share of revenues from gate fees. Private 
landowners on Olchorro Oiroua took NCC to court and in 1994 they won a ruling 
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allowing them to collect gate fees from visitors staying on their land16 (Barrow et al. 
2000:86; Lamprey & Reid 2004:1024; Thompson & Homewood 2002:127). They 
established the Olchorro Oiroua Wildlife Management and Conservation Association 
(OOWMCA) and started collecting revenues from visitors staying in tourism 
facilities on their own land, but also from three lodges located on neighbouring 
Koyiaki and Lemek group ranches.  
Group ranch members on Koyiaki and Lemek realised that they were being 
cheated by the OOWMCA and started blocking tour vehicles from lodges on 
Olchorro Oiroua. An agreement was reached and the newly created Koyiaki-Lemek 
Wildlife Trust (KLWT) was allowed to collect wildlife revenue from the lodges on 
Koyiaki and Lemek (Thompson & Homewood 2002:127; Lamprey & Reid 
2004:1024). The local elites on Koyiaki and Lemek were initially opposed to the 
wildlife association, but soon realised they could benefit and established themselves 
as leaders in the fledgling association (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]).  
The wildlife trusts generated large amounts of revenue. The trust officials 
became very powerful within the community, as they controlled the allocation of 
funds for education bursaries, health schemes and development of infrastructure on 
the group ranches (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]).  However, very little of the 
tourism revenue was distributed to ordinary group ranch members. The majority of 
tourism revenue was diverted into the pockets of trust officials by various 
administrative mechanisms (Thompson & Homewood 2002:127; Lamprey & Reid 
2004:998).  
In 1997 Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust paid 16% of its income as dividends to 
members, while another 6,5 % was used for education bursaries, health schemes and 
roads. The remaining income (77,5%) was used for salaries and benefits for trustees 
and staff (55,5 %), and for other operational costs (22%). Individual Board Members 
                                              
16 At the time, the official park fees were USD 20 per person per day (Honey 1999:315). 
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received sitting allowances of up to USD 4000 per year (Thompson & Homewood 
2002:127). 
3.1.3 2001-2006: Subdivision of Land and Fragmentation of 
Wildlife Trusts 
In the Mara, the revenues from wildlife tourism increased greatly during the 1990s 
(Earnshaw & Emerton 2000:327). Park entrance and game viewing fees increased 
substantially17 and the bed capacity of lodges doubled from 1987 to 200018. By 1999 
the group ranches were so saturated with lodges and camps that the Ministry of 
Tourism placed a moratorium on further developments in the area (Lamprey & Reid 
2004:1024). 
The returns to the local population rose more than proportionally during the 
same period. Earnshaw and Emerton (2000:328) estimate that by 2000 about 10% of 
gross income from wildlife tourism was collected by Narok County Council, while an 
additional 5 % accrued to the group ranches. Wage-earning opportunities also 
increased due to the expansion of the tourism industry. However, the local population 
was still marginalised in the distribution of tourism revenues. 
 Local elites had benefited greatly from tourism revenues in the 1990s due to 
their leadership positions on the wildlife trusts. However, a sub-division process was 
under way on the group ranches that would soon lead to the dissolution of these 
wildlife trusts. 
Subdivision of group ranches 
At the end of the 1990s, the many court-cases blocking subdivision in the Mara were 
coming to an end, and the group ranches started to divide the communally owned 
                                              
17 MMNR gate fees increased from USD 5 in 1987 to USD 27 in 1996 (Earnshaw & Emerton 2000:328) 
18 The bed capacity of the lodges in the Mara increased from 1,080 in 1987 to 1,896 in 2000 (Earnshaw & Emerton 
2000:328) 
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land into small parcels with individual title deeds (Norton-Griffiths et. al. 2006:8). 
Lemek completed the subdivision process in 1999, while on Koyiaki individual titles 
were issued on land located next to the MMNR in 2002 (Lamprey & Reid 2004:1022; 
Thompson & Homewood 2002:115).  
 Group ranch members in the Mara had several incentives to sub-divide 
communally owned land. Security of tenure was perhaps the most pervasive 
incentive, as group ranch members felt threatened that their land could be grabbed by 
corrupt elites or swallowed by the enlargement of protected areas (Norton-Griffiths et 
al. 2006:8; Norton-Griffiths 2008). Second, group ranch members were motivated by 
the opportunity to capture revenue directly at household level without going through 
corrupt group ranch committees. Thirdly, they wanted to avoid further dilution of 
common resources by population growth and in-migration (Lamprey & Reid 
2004:1021; Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:8; Norton-Griffiths 2008). And finally, sub-
division allowed group ranch members to capture the rising value of land19, by 
selling their individual parcels or assessing credit to develop them (Norton-Griffiths
et al. 2006:9; Norton-Griffiths 20
 
08). 
                                             
 Generational changes also played an important role in the sub-division process 
in the Mara. A younger generation with better education had emerged, who wanted 
greater control of their own future. They saw sub-division as the key to secure 
economic independence for themselves and their families (Norton-Griffiths et al. 
2006:8). 
The principle of land-allocation on Koyiaki was for all members to get an 
equal share of land close to where they lived (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 and J. Sipitiek 
07.03.08 [Interviews]). However, local elites, who had access to the group ranch 
register and a map giving the location of plots, were able to manipulate the sub-
division process for their own benefit. By changing the location of their land, they 
 
19 Land values on group ranches in the Mara rose by almost 400 % after subdivision (Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:9) 
 54 
secured plots in areas with tourism facilities, permanent access to water or favourable 
grazing (Lamprey & Reid 2004:1022; Thompson & Homewood 2002:118).  
The sub-division of group ranches shook up the established patterns of control 
in the community and opened up new opportunities for social institutions to develop 
(Thompson and Homewood 2002:134). Initially, the sub-division of land led to the 
fragmentation of wildlife trusts and the exclusion of many landowners from tourism 
revenue. However, the individualisation of landownership also gave rise to new 
institutions such as wildlife conservancies. 
The exclusion of landowners and fragmentation of wildlife trusts 
Conservation NGOs feared the consequences of sub-division and hastily assisted the 
communities in developing a natural resource management plan for Koyiaki, Lemek 
and Olchorro Oiroua group ranches (Lamprey & Reid 2004:1025). The plan 
prescribed the zoning of the areas into three different land uses: i) wildlife and 
tourism, ii) livestock grazing, and iii) agricultural production (ACC 2001). 
 After Lemek completed the subdivision process in 1999, the leadership of 
Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust saw an opportunity to limit the number of people 
benefiting from tourism income. Residents of Lemek with land in the agricultural and 
livestock zones were excluded from tourism revenues on the grounds that they 
already had other sources of income and did not have tourism facilities or vehicles on 
their land (Thompson & Homewood 2002:128).  
The same exclusionary processes took place on Koyiaki after the sub-division 
of land in the areas close to the MMNR was finalised in 2002. The landowners in this 
part of Koyiaki had their plots located in the wildlife zone and decided to exclude 
other landowners from getting a share of the tourism revenue (D. ole Muli 10.03.08 
[Interview]). They argued that other landowners did not give up any land for 
conservation and therefore did not deserve any tourism income. The last group to be 
excluded was landowners in the wildlife zone who were located too far away from 
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the tourism facilities to have tour vehicles enter their land (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 
[Interview]). 
 During the same period of time, Kenya faced a heavily contested 
parliamentary election. In Narok South, where Koyiaki and Lemek are located, two 
candidates battled fiercely for the votes20. The two parliamentary contenders tried to 
enlist the support of wildlife trust officials, as these trustees had significant political 
power in the community. Soon the trustees of KLWT were divided in two opposing 
camps, each supporting a different candidate. These political divisions created 
mistrust and KLWT broke into four splinter groups, two on each group ranch (D. 
Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]). 
Local elites saw the new wildlife associations as vehicles for personal 
enrichment and political careers and continued the corrupt practises of the wildlife 
trusts. Dissatisfaction with the management of these new wildlife associations caused 
yet more splinter groups to be formed (D. Kaelo 06.03.08, J. Rakwa 09.03.08 and J. 
Kisemei 10.03.08 [Interviews]) increasing the number of wildlife associations to four 
on Lemek and six on Koyiaki21. 
The establishment of wildlife conservancies 
While the subdivision of group ranches led to the fragmentation of wildlife trusts and 
exclusion of landowners from tourism revenue, it also created opportunities for 
landowners to create new institutions to benefit from wildlife tourism.  
 By 2005 the Kenyan ministry of local government was demanding an end to 
the sharing of revenue from the MMNR, directing that Narok County Council should 
be the only agent to collect gate fees from visitors going into the reserve (The 
                                              
20 Ethnic division is a regular feature in Kenyan politics, but did not play a significant role in Narok South constituency, as 
the local population is almost entirely Maasai. 
21 On Koyiaki group ranch: Koyiaki Wildlife Association*, Maasai Mara Conservation Association*, Koyiaki Landowners 
Wildlife Association, Reto Wildlife Association, Saruni Wildlife Association, Koyiaki Talek Wildlife Conservation 
Association *Initial splinter groups after the 2002 elections (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]. 
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Standard 2005a; 2005b; 2005c). With the end of tourism revenue sharing in sight22, 
Maasai landowners were looking for new institutional models to benefit from wildlife 
tourism.  
Different landowners in the wildlife zone close to the reserve made several 
attempts to capture tourism revenue by pooling their land together to create 
conservation areas. By keeping these areas undeveloped they could charge tour 
operators to take tourists for game viewing (Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006:9). The 
majority of these conservation areas failed due to poor management, but Olare Orok 
Conservancy is a success story that continues to create revenues for its members. 
3.1.4 Summary 
The establishment of MMNR in 1961 and the ban on consumptive utilisation of 
wildlife in 1977 largely excluded the Maasai from wildlife revenue. The introduction 
of group ranches in the early 1970s concentrated power in the hands of local elites 
who used their positions to misappropriate group ranch revenues. 
 In the beginning of the 1990s, KWS introduced a new wildlife policy that 
recognised the participation of communities in wildlife conservation. The new 
wildlife policy empowered local communities to establish wildlife trusts and 
successfully challenge Narok County Council for a share of tourism revenue. Due to 
the persistence of group ranches, these revenues were largely appropriated by the 
local elites. 
 The subdivision of group ranches in the period between 1999 and 2002 altered 
power relations in the community and opened new opportunities for landowners to 
benefit from wildlife tourism. Land privatisation initially led to an exclusion of some 
landowners from tourism revenues and the dissolution of wildlife trusts. However, 
                                              
22 In July 2006 Narok County Council stopped sharing MMNR-revenues with the wildlife associations (A. Stuart 11.03.08 
[Interview]). 
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individual titles to land also allowed landowners to pool their land and create wildlife 
conservancies to benefit from wildlife tourism. 
3.2 The Establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy 
Despite a moratorium on new developments being in place, more than 50 new lodges 
and camps were built in the Mara between 2000 and 2006 and the bed capacity 
doubled from approximately 2000 bed nights to over 4000 bed nights (Ecotourism 
Kenya 2006:10). This unchecked development of tourism facilities led to a 
congestion of the Maasai Mara National Reserve, reducing its aesthetic value. As a 
result, tourism entrepreneurs were looking for more exclusive wildlife areas where 
they could take their clients (I. Feyo 08.03.08 [Interview]).  
Landowners on Olare Orok had been excluded from tourism revenues after the 
subdivision of land and initially started their own wildlife association to demand a 
share of the revenue. Other splinter groups had been successful in demanding 
revenues by stopping tour vehicles on their land, but as no vehicles were entering 
Olare Orok, they failed to capture a share of tourism revenues (Kaelo 06.03.08 
[Interview]). 
 Local elites realized that their only opportunity to benefit from wildlife 
tourism was to establish a private conservation area on their land. By pooling their 
land together and removing settlements and cattle, they could offer tourism 
entrepreneurs exclusive access to a prime wildlife viewing area (Kaelo 06.03.08 
[Interview]).  
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3.2.1 Decision-making Process 
Kipeen ole Sayielel, an ex-chief on Koyiaki, had the key initiative to establish the 
conservancy. Together with a group of community leaders he visited every boma23 in 
the area, convincing the other landowners about the need to benefit from tourism. 
These community leaders subsequently gathered the landowners in the area for 
several barazas, or public meetings, where they discussed how to make money from 
wildlife tourism (D. Rakwa 12.03.08, J. Siololo 07.03.08 and D. Kirokor 14.03.08 
[Interviews]). 
 After the community members had agreed on the need to set up a conservancy, 
Sayielel approached Ron Beaton and Dickson Kaelo for help (D. Rakwa 12.03.08 
[Interview]). Beaton was a former lodge-owner who had recently bought land in the 
area to retire after 30 years in the tourism industry. Kaelo was a researcher with the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and former manager of KLWT. 
Sayielel argued that they had a beautiful piece of land with a lot of tourism potential, 
but they needed partners in the tourist industry who could finance the conservancy 
and help set up a business model (Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]). Beaton had many 
contacts in the tourism industry and put the landowners in contact with Jake Grieves-
Cook of Porini camps. Grieves-Cook had previous experience with setting up a 
conservancy close to Amboseli National Park and was immediately interested in the 
idea (J. Grieves-Cook 03.03.08 and R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interviews]). 
Kaelo and Beaton came up with a business model for the conservancy together 
with the tourism partners. They were aware of the fluctuations in the tourism industry 
in Kenya and specifically sought to establish a model that would protect the local 
communities from harm (R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]). The result was a business 
model where the tourism partners would lease the land from the landowners and 
                                              
23 A “boma” is a traditional Maasai homestead comprised of a central livestock coral surrounded by a ring of low huts 
(Lamprey & Reid 2004:1001). 
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guarantee them a fixed income, regardless of the number of tourists who visited the 
conservancy.  
Sayielel and Beaton organised more than 30 meetings with the landowners 
over the next six months to convince them to join the conservancy. Maasai elders are 
traditionally very sceptical to change and two issues were especially controversial: 
the proposed business model and the issue of moving people out of the conservancy 
(D. Kaelo 06.03.08 and R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interviews]).  
The business model of the OOC differed from previous arrangements for 
wildlife management on the group ranches in two important ways. First, tourism 
revenue being paid to landowners was not directly linked to the number of tourists 
visiting the conservancy. Instead, the landowners would be paid a fixed monthly sum 
to lease out their land. This arrangement implied that landowners would be paid the 
same amount of money in times of booms and crises. Not only was this arrangement 
different from what they were used to, but the tourism business was also booming at 
the time. This meant that landowners in other areas were making more money from 
entrance fees than what members of the OOC would be paid to lease out their land 
(R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]). 
Second, the business model specified that revenue would be collected and 
distributed by an independent body and that there would be no sitting fees for 
members of the landowners committee. Leadership positions in wildlife trusts and 
associations had traditionally been very lucrative for the individuals who occupied 
them. Several landowners on Olare Orok had ambitions to get elected as officials in 
the proposed conservancy and benefit from such leadership positions (R. Beaton 
09.03.08 and E. Tira 13.03.08 [Interviews]). 
Sayielel and Beaton managed to convince the landowners that a lease-structure 
would be the best solution and that an independent body could best handle the 
collection and distribution of revenue. Young, educated landowners played a crucial 
role in the resolution of these two issues as they understood the business model and 
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could counsel the older generation. However, many landowners were illiterate and as 
many as one-third of them probably signed up to the conservancy without 
understanding the business model (R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]). 
The second controversial issue was the question of moving people and 
settlements out of the conservancy. Local leaders realised that it would be much 
easier to reach an agreement with the tourism partners if the area was less developed 
(D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]).  
The local landowners were not against the idea of setting up a conservancy, 
but they had lived on the land for a long time and grown accustomed to the area. 
There was good grazing for the cattle and access to water. Many landowners had also 
built solid houses with tin roofs that were difficult to move (J. Siololo 07.03.08 
[Interview]).  
Sayielel and Beaton argued that people should open their eyes to the fact that 
they could not survive on cattle alone. The conservancy would give landowners a 
steady income and the camps within the conservancy would provide jobs for the 
community. But in order to access these benefits people had to move out of the 
conservancy (J. Siololo 07.03.08 and D. Naurori 09.03.08 [Interviews]).  
Some landowners lived on other peoples land and could easily be removed. 
Other landowners held pieces of land in other areas of Koyiaki and could move their 
bomas to these parcels. The process was greatly simplified by the effort of local elites 
who assisted landowners with the costs of moving their buildings and belongings. 
After three months all the bomas were removed from the area (D. Rakwa 12.03.08 
and D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interviews]). 
3.2.2 Negotiation and Implementation 
After the residents had moved out, Olare Orok became a very beautiful area. Animals 
came out of hiding and the vegetation grew back. A lot of people now realized the 
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potential the area had for wildlife tourism and wanted to invest in the conservancy 
(D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]). 
Finally the community was ready to negotiate. Ron Beaton was appointed the 
representative of the landowners, as he had long experience dealing with the 
mzungus24 in the tourism industry. The tourist partners, represented by Jake-Grieves 
Cook, made the first proposal about how much they would pay to lease the land. The 
offer was based on the payoffs to agriculture in different rainfall zones in the Mara. 
To secure long-term stability, the conservancy should be preferable to competing 
land-use options, like agriculture.  
The final lease agreement ended a bit higher than the first offer, at KES 1500 
per hectare per year25. While Beaton was able to push Grieves-Cook quite 
successfully, the tourist partners had the upper hand as they could always pull out of 
the negotiations (J. Grieves-Cook 03.03.08, D. Kaelo 06.03.08 and R. Beaton 
09.03.08 [Interviews]). 
 The agreement between landowners and tourism entrepreneurs was reached in 
May 2006, but the conservancy only took shape gradually. It started by occupying 
only a third of today’s size, but grew slowly as more and more landowners realised 
that they could benefit (J. Grieves-Cook 03.03.08 [Interview]). The initial agreement 
took the form of a memorandum of understanding for an 18-month period. If any of 
the parties were dissatisfied with the agreement they could back out after this period 
ended (R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]). 
The landowners were used to being cheated by politicians and leaders, and this 
gradual implementation of the conservancy was necessary to keep their trust. When 
the landowners received their first payment, Sayielel and Beaton brought the whole 
                                              
24“Mzungu” is Swahili for a white or European person. 
25 Average size of land-holdings is 60 hectares (150 acres) (R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]. 
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USD 20,000 in cash. The landowners wanted to see the money with their own eyes to 
believe it was true26 (R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]).  
Six months before the first agreement ended, a meeting of landowners was 
organized to discuss the future. The landowners had experienced that the model was 
working and that they were being paid regularly (R. Beaton 09.03.08 [Interview]). 
The tourist partners offered to increase the rent to 2000 KES per hectare per year, 
regulated for increases in MMNR game viewing fees, and the land-holders agreed to 
sign on to five-year leases for their land. 
The process of signing the leases went on until November 2007 when 
agreements had been signed with 154 landowners (I. Feyo 08.03.08 [Interview]). 
Some young landowners had still not signed up to leases as they were unhappy with 
the management of the conservancy and wanted more money. They argued that 
community leaders benefited more from the conservancy as some of them owned 
larger parcels of land27 and were being paid for having camps on their land (D. 
Naurori 09.03.08 and D. Kirokor 14.03.08 [Interviews]). 
Ten young landowners pulled out of the conservancy in 2007 to set up their 
own wildlife viewing area. They negotiated an agreement with the neighbouring 
Nyumbo lodge and were paid fees of USD 40 per client per day (D. Naurori 09.03.08 
[Interview]). In the beginning the members of Nyumbo trust were paid almost double 
of what landowners on Olare Orok Conservancy received. However, with the onset of 
the post-election violence in Kenya in January 2008, the tourists disappeared from the 
Mara and the revenue collected by the Nyumbo trust dropped to almost nothing. By 
March 2008, four of the landowners that originally defected to the Nyumbo trust had 
signed leases with the OOC (I. Feyo 08.03.08 and R. O’Meara 27.03.08 
[Interviews]). 
                                              
26 Landowners now receive their rents into personal bank accounts (R. Beaton 08.03.08 [Interview]). 
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 Currently, there are virtually no tourists in the Mara due to the post-election 
violence in Kenya. Most landowners in the dispersal areas around the MMNR receive 
no tourism incomes, as their revenues are linked to the number of tourists who visit 
the area. Olare Orok Conservancy is probably the only solvent conservancy in the 
Mara today. All the camps in the OOC are closed, but the tourist partners have 
guaranteed to pay the landowners for leasing their land and the landowners still 
receive 10 000 KES (USD 150) into their accounts each month (R. Beaton 09.03.08 
[Interview]). 
3.2.3 Summary 
Landowners on Olare Orok were excluded from wildlife revenues and realised that 
establishing a wildlife conservancy was their only opportunity to benefit from 
wildlife tourism. Tourism entrepreneurs were looking for more exclusive wildlife 
areas where they could take their clients due to the overcrowding of the MMNR. 
 Local elites had the most to benefit from the establishment of a wildlife 
conservancy and convinced the other landowners to join. They employed the 
resources of two facilitators to help set up the conservancy. These two facilitators 
played a central role in the creation of the OOC by coming up with an institutional 
model and facilitating the decision-making process in the community. 
 Two controversial issues complicated the institutional creation process. First, 
the proposed institutional model was different from previous institutional 
arrangements on the group ranches. Landowners would receive a fixed monthly sum 
instead of getting a fee per tourist who visited the conservancy. And revenues would 
not be handled by elected officials, but by an independent body. 
 Second, people and settlements had to be removed from the proposed 
conservation area. The landowners supported the idea of a conservancy, but removing 
                                                                                                                                           
27 Sayielel owns 1000 acres of land in the conservancy, compared with the 150 acres of regular landowners (D. Kaelo 
06.03.08 [Interview]. 
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their settlements and cattle involved costs related to transportation and finding new 
areas to settle and graze their animals. 
 Conservative older landowners were initially sceptical to these changes. Local 
elites allied with educated young landowners to convince their older relatives of the 
benefits of the new conservancy. The costs of landowners were also mitigated by an 
agreement to allow grazing of cattle in the conservancy during the tourism low-
season and the provision of free transportation for moving their settlements.  
 Landowners were used to being cheated by their leaders and the 
implementation of the conservancy took place gradually to build trust in the 
community. The initial agreement arranged for an 18-month trial period after which 
the landowners could back out if they were dissatisfied. Only after this period did 
they sign on to formal leases. The first payments were made in cash so the 
landowners could see with their own eyes that they were not being cheated 
A group of young landowners were unhappy with the distribution of revenues 
and argued that local elites benefited more from the conservancy than ordinary 
landowners. They pulled out of the OOC to establish their own conservancy, but due 
to the post-election violence in Kenya their income dwindled. Four of these young 
landowners have now signed on to leases with the OOC. 
Currently there are no tourists in the Mara and most landowners in the areas 
around the MMNR receive no tourism income, as their revenues are linked to the 
number of tourists visiting the area. All the camps in the OOC are closed, but 




The previous chapter describes how the institutional setting in the Mara has 
influenced which opportunities are open to landowners and how individuals have 
interacted to establish a wildlife conservancy on Olare Orok. In this chapter I use the 
concepts of path dependence and contracting to analyse these processes. 
The first part of the chapter analyses how changes in wildlife policy and land 
tenure altered power structures in the community and opened a path for the creation 
of new institutions in the areas bordering the MMNR. 
 The second part of the chapter analyses the interaction among actors in 
establishing the conservancy. It identifies which actors had the most influence on the 
establishment of the conservancy, which interests and resources they had, and how 
they formed alliances to further their own interests in the institutional creation 
process. 
4.1 Path Dependence in Distribution of Wildlife Revenues 
in the Mara 
Current social phenomena can not be adequately comprehended without a proper 
understanding of how they have been shaped by the past. Decisions made in the past 
continue to influence which institutional options are available in the present (Pierson 
& Skocpol 2002:10). 
 By using the concept of path dependence we can trace the historical processes 
that influenced which institutional options were available for landowners on Olare 
Orok. Path dependence is based on the identification of a critical juncture that starts 
an institutional path. The path is reinforced over time as the feasibility of adopting 
other institutional alternatives diminishes and is perpetuated until a new critical 
juncture disrupts the path. (Mwangi 2006:159). 
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 The establishment of the Maasai Mara National Reserve and the ban on 
consumptive utilisation of wildlife created an institutional path that excludes the 
Maasai from wildlife revenue. However, the introduction of community conservation 
policies in the 1990s and the subdivision of group ranches around the year 2000 
disrupted this institutional path and created new alternatives for institutional 
development in the Mara. 
4.1.1 Exclusion of the Maasai from Wildlife Revenues 
During the first decades after independence, a situation was established in which the 
Maasai were largely excluded from wildlife revenues.  
The first critical event that triggered this institutional path was the creation of 
Maasai Mara National Reserve in 1961. The establishment of the reserve removed 
traditional grazing land from the control of the local Maasai population and 
transferred the territory to Narok County Council.  
The formation of the MMNR benefited tourism entrepreneurs, the government, 
and the county council. Tourism entrepreneurs could use the reserve as an exclusive 
wildlife viewing area for tourists. Narok County Council generated tourism revenues 
from park fees, while the central government benefited through taxes from the 
tourism industry. The increasing number of tourists that visited Kenya in the 1980s 
turned the MMNR into a cash cow for these interests. 
The exclusion of the local Maasai from tourism revenues became a self-
reinforcing institutional path as an alliance of conservation interests, tourism 
entrepreneurs and the local and central government benefited from the sustained 
operation of the reserve. The local Maasai were largely uneducated and had few 
resources to take up the fight against these powerful actors.  
 The ban on the commercial exploitation of wildlife in 1977 was a second 
critical event that further reinforced the institutional path that excluded the local 
Maasai from wildlife revenues. The ban transferred the ownership of all wildlife 
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resources from the landowner to the state, and stopped the lucrative sport hunting 
industry that had been an important source of income for the local communities. 
 The ban was introduced as a result of pressure from foreign governments and 
international conservation organisations to stop the poaching of wildlife. The Kenyan 
government feared that these actors could hold back development aid and hurt the 
image of Kenya as a tourism destination if it did not comply. 
 Once again the local Maasai had few opportunities to change the institutional 
path as it was supported by a powerful coalition of international conservation 
interests, tourism entrepreneurs and the Kenyan government. The local Maasai 
population continued to be excluded from wildlife revenues until the introduction of 
community conservation policies by the Kenyan government in the 1990s. 
4.1.2 Community Conservation and Sharing of Tourism Revenues 
During the 1990s, the overall institutional path of wildlife revenue distribution in the 
Mara was maintained. Tourism entrepreneurs, the central government and Narok 
County Council continued to receive the majority of revenues from wildlife tourism. 
However, a new opportunity arose that allowed some of the revenue from MMNR 
park fees to be shared with neighbouring group ranches.  
 The new KWS wildlife policy was the critical event that triggered the sharing 
of park fees from the MMNR. The policy recognised the participation of local 
communities in wildlife conservation and outlined a revenue sharing programme to 
benefit communities living adjacent to national parks and reserves. 
 The change in wildlife policy was a result of strong pressure from the 
international community to stop the loss of biodiversity in Kenya. The Kenyan 
government complied as feared damage to Kenya’s image as a pristine tourism 
destination. 
The new wildlife policy empowered local elites on the group ranches adjacent 
to the MMNR to challenge the local county council over park fees from the reserve. 
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Narok County Council was forced to share gate fees from the reserve as government 
agencies actively supported the local communities in their endeavours to benefit from 
wildlife on their land.  
 The perseverance of the group ranch system maintained an institutional setting 
where local elites captured a majority of tourism revenues that accrued to the group 
ranches, while ordinary members to a large degree were excluded from tourism 
incomes. Decision-making power on the group ranches was allocated to a small 
group of people who used their power to misappropriate funds and further strengthen 
their power in the community. During the 1990s, these group ranch officials used 
their power to establish themselves as leaders of the new wildlife trusts and continue 
their corrupt practises. 
 The sharing of revenue from the MMNR reinforced the exclusionary practises 
on the group ranches by further strengthening the position of group ranch officials. 
These local elites benefited from the status quo and had few incentives to change the 
institutional arrangements that influenced the distribution of wildlife revenues in the 
Mara. This institutional setting remained in place until the group ranches were 
subdivided around the year 2000. 
4.1.3 Sub-division of Land and Empowerment of Individual 
Landowners 
The institutional path that largely excluded the Maasai from tourism income still 
remained in place at the turn of the millennia. However, the privatisation of land 
altered power structures in the community and opened up new paths for institutional 
development.  
The completion of sub-division on group ranches in the Mara around the year 
2000 gave ordinary group ranch members control over the use of their own land and 
strengthened their power in the community. Local elites were weakened as they could 
no longer use their positions as group ranch officials to exercise power. 
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The change in power relations had several effects on the institutional set-up in 
the community. One result of sub-division was the exclusion of landowners from 
tourism revenue. Individual titles to land made it easy to define who “owned” the 
wildlife viewing areas and exclude the other landowners from benefiting. Another 
effect of land privatisation was the fragmentation of the wildlife trusts into several 
wildlife associations. The sub-division of the group ranches had weakened the 
position of local elites and empowered a new generation of leaders to break out and 
form their own wildlife associations. 
  The individualisation of landownership also opened up new institutional paths 
for landowners to benefit from wildlife tourism. Individual titles to land allowed 
landowners to pool their land together and negotiate directly with tourism 
entrepreneurs to create wildlife conservancies. In contrast to the old group ranch 
system, they now controlled their own land had the power to claim a fair share of 
revenue from these private conservation areas. 
4.1.4 Summary 
The establishment of Maasai Mara National Reserve and the ban on consumptive 
utilisation of wildlife created an institutional path where the Maasai were largely 
excluded from wildlife revenue. This path was self-reinforcing as a powerful 
coalition of tourism entrepreneurs, conservationists and the local and central 
government benefited from sustaining the institutional setting. 
KWS introduced community conservation policies and thereby empowered 
group ranches to claim a share of MMNR revenues. However, the perseverance of the 
group ranch system allowed local elites to misappropriate the tourism revenues that 
accrued to the group ranches. 
The subdivision of group ranches in the Mara altered power relations in the 
community by giving ordinary landowners greater control over their land.  Local 
elites were forced to take their interests into account, giving ordinary landowners 
greater potential to benefit from wildlife tourism.  
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4.2 The Establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy: A 
Rational-actor Analysis 
Individuals create institutions to promote their private well-being and as a result the 
process of institutional creation is likely to be divisive (Libecap 1989:11; Gibson 
1999:12). In order to explain the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy, it is 
therefore necessary to describe the actors who influenced the process, identify their 
interests and resources and explore how they established alliances to further their 
interests in the institutionalisation process. 
4.2.1 Actors, Interests and Resources 
Four main groups of actors influenced the creation of Olare Orok Conservancy: i) 
ordinary landowners, ii) young landowners, iii) local elites, and iv) tourism 
entrepreneurs. Two individuals played a central role in facilitating the institutional 
creation process and constitute a fifth category.  
Below I describe the five categories of actors that were involved in creating 
the conservancy, discuss their interests in developing the conservancy, and identify 
which resources they used to promote their interests.  
i) Ordinary landowners 
Landowners on Olare Orok are former group ranch members, who were allocated 
parcels of land when the group ranch was subdivided28. Since only family heads were 
registered as group ranch members, the majority of landowners are men, with the 
exception of a few widows who have inherited their husbands. Livestock keeping is 
the dominating livelihood of landowners on Olare Orok. 
                                              
28 There are 154 landowners in Olare Orok Conservancy and the average size of individual parcels is 60 hectares (150 
acres) (I. Feyo 08.03.08 [Interview]. 
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Interests 
The main interest for ordinary landowners on Olare Orok was to maximise their 
return from the land. The landowners held their land under freehold tenure and were 
free to choose among several alternative ways of using their land29. Their land-use 
decisions were primarily based on the differential returns available from agricultural, 
livestock and wildlife production (Norton-Griffiths et al. 2006; Norton-Griffiths 
2007; Thompson & Homewood 2002).  
 Agricultural rents in the Mara are on average much higher than the rents 
available from either livestock production or wildlife tourism30 (Norton-Griffiths 
2007). However, on Olare Orok land could not be leased out for mechanised 
agriculture, due to the poor quality of the soil and the lack of infrastructure in the 
area. While small-scale agriculture and livestock grazing were alternative land-use 
options, they could not compete with the rents that could be derived from wildlife 
tourism (I. Feyo 08.03.08 [Interview]). 
The proposed conservation area was highly suitable for wildlife tourism and 
landowners could generate significant revenues by leasing out the land to tourism 
entrepreneurs. The terrain was aesthetically pleasing with hills, rivers and trees and 
provided good sites for tourism facilities. Its location on the border of the MMNR 
also meant that animals could move freely between the conservancy and the reserve 
(D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]). 
For the landowners, the most important potential cost associated with the 
establishment of the conservancy was the obligation to move their settlements out of 
the conservancy. Relocating their bomas involved both labour efforts and the costs of 
transportation. However, this cost did not apply to all landowners as some owned 
                                              
29 Lamprey & Reid (2004:1025) identify five different land-use options that are available for individual landowners: i) 
commoditisation of livestock production, ii) amalgation of landholdings to create conservancies for wildlife tourism, iii) 
small-scale cultivation, iv) lease out land for mechanised agriculture, and v) sale of land.  
30 See Annex 2: Returns to agriculture, livestock and wildlife in the Mara Area, as a function of mean annual rainfall. 
 72 
land that was uninhabited due to the seasonal presence of tsetse flies31. For the 
landowners that had to move, the costs were mitigated by the fact that many also had 
parcels in other areas of Koyiaki where they could settle (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 
[Interview]). 
 Another potential cost associated with the creation of the OOC was the 
removal of cattle from the conservancy. Landowners still needed a place to graze 
their cattle after the establishment of the conservancy, but with the subdivision of 
land on Koyiaki, it was becoming increasingly difficult to find grazing areas. Thus, 
ordinary landowners had a major interest in continued access to the conservancy for 
livestock grazing (I. Feyo 08.03.08 [Interview].  
Resources 
At first glance it may seem like ordinary landowners on Olare Orok had few 
resources to promote their interests in the creation of the OOC. Most of them were 
illiterate and they had little exposure to the wider world. With their limited 
knowledge of external affairs they lacked the prerequisites to understand complex 
business models. They also lacked the financial resources necessary to facilitate the 
creation of a conservancy.   
The landowners had one crucial resource, though, their title to land. Under 
Kenyan law they had almost complete freedom in deciding over their own land and 
this literally gave them veto power in the creation of the conservancy. If one or more 
landowners decided to pull out and develop their land, the conservancy would lose 
the pristine character that made it attractive to tourism entrepreneurs, and the 
conservancy would fail. These “veto powers” were strengthened by the Maasai 
tradition of democratic and consensual decision making. Important decisions in the 
community would be made at public meetings (barazas) where all adult males would 
be present. 
                                              
31 Tsetse fly-bites can transmit sleeping sickness to both humans and animals. If not treated, the disease is potentially fatal 
(Encyclopædia Britannica Online 2008). 
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However, an element of group pressure existed in the community. If 
landowners decided to pull out and develop their land, it would also undermine the 
opportunity of other landowners to benefit from wildlife tourism (R. O’Meara 
27.03.08 [Interview]). If landowners had decided to pull out they are likely to have 
met discontent from other landowners, and possibly faced social sanctions. 
ii) Young landowners 
The young landowners are the last generation of men who were admitted as group 
ranch members, before the group ranch was subdivided. Many of them have 
benefited from primary and secondary education, thanks to educational bursaries 
from Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust. Most of them are between 20 and 30 years old. 
Interests 
The young landowners shared the interest of other landowners in maximising the 
returns from their own land through wildlife tourism and also faced the same 
potential costs of removing settlements and cattle from the conservancy. In addition 
they were motivated to establish a wildlife conservancy by the prospect of wage-
earning opportunities. Many of them had attended school and were prime candidates 
for jobs if the conservancy was established. 
 Young landowners were aware of how wildlife trust officials had used their 
power to misappropriate tourism revenues in the past and did not want the same to 
happen if a wildlife conservancy was established on Olare Orok. Being located at the 
bottom of the Maasai hierarchy they had a special interest in the establishment of 
structures and rules to ensure a fair distribution of revenues in the proposed 
conservancy. 
Resources 
Ownership to land was still the most important resource to the young landowners. 
However, they had some advantages in furthering their interests in comparison to the 
older generations. Most importantly, they had greater access to information and a 
better understanding of institutional issues. Attending school had taught them to read, 
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write and do maths, skills that were crucial to understand business models and 
governance structures proposed by the local elite and tourism entrepreneurs. Some of 
the young landowners had also been employed in the tourism industry and knew 
something about how it operated. 
iii) Local elites 
Local elites are individuals who have previously occupied leadership positions in 
group ranches and wildlife associations, or have been employed in the local 
government administration. They often own large amounts of land, cattle and 
commercial properties, and as noted above, their accumulation of wealth has usually 
been closely linked to the positions they have occupied.  
As Olare Orok is a small area, the local elite counted only a handful of 
members. Kipeen ole Sayielel was arguable the most influential among these 
members. He had previously been a chief32 of Koyiaki location and owned large 
tracts of land and valuable commercial properties33.  
Interests  
The local elites who were involved in the establishment of Olare Orok also shared the 
interest of maximising the returns from their land. However, they had a stronger 
interest in creating the conservancy, as they expected to benefit more than other 
landowners34. Sayielel owned large areas of land in Olare Orok and would receive a 
much higher rent from leasing out his land to the conservancy than other 
landowners35. Other members of the local elite controlled prime parcels of land that 
                                              
32 In Kenya “chiefs” are government employees assigned to administrate a local administrative unit or “location” (CLGF 
2008).   
33 Sayielel controlled 400 hectares of land on Koyiaki, six times as much land as the average landowner (D. Kaelo 14.03.08 
[Interview]). 
34 Local elites make as much as KES 70 000 – 200 000 (USD 1000 – 3000) from the conservancy each month, as compared 
to KES 10 000 (USD 140) of normal landowners (R. O’Meara 27.03.08 [Interview]). 
35 Landowners are paid KES 2000 (USD 30) per hectare per year.  
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were suitable for camps36, and could potentially generate additional income from 
leasing out their land to camps. 
 The local elite did not live inside the proposed conservation area and had 
potentially fewer costs related to removing their settlements and cattle from the land. 
However, convincing other landowners to join the conservancy remained a major 
potential cost for the local elites. Due to the tradition of consensual decision making, 
the local elites would have to spend considerable time and material resources to 
organise public meetings where decisions about the establishment of a conservancy 
would be made. For every meeting, they needed to provide transport for the 
participants and slaughter goats or cattle to feed them (R. Beaton 08.03.08 
[Interview]). 
Resources 
The local elites had three important types of resources that gave them great leverage 
in the institutional creation process. First, they were community leaders and had a lot 
of authority among the landowners. One of them was a retired chief of Koyiaki 
location, another had been an official of Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust, and a third 
had been a teacher at a local primary school. All of them commanded considerable 
respect in the community and were listened to by the other landowners.  
Second, the local elites had information and contacts that other landowners 
lacked. They were informed about developments in the tourism industry and had 
knowledge of different wildlife management models in the Mara. Some had contacts 
in the tourism industry and could bring in tourism entrepreneurs with financial capital 
and experience from managing tourism destinations.  
Finally, the local elites had financial resources to support the institutional 
creation process. They used their financial resources to facilitate the decision-making 
                                              
36 Currently all three camps in the conservancy are located on pieces of land controlled by local elites or there immediate 
families (D. Kaelo 14.03.08 [Interview]). 
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process by organising transport and food for landowners taking part in barazas 
(community meetings). Later they assisted residents of Olare Orok with vehicles to 
remove their settlements from the conservation area. 
iv) Tourism entrepreneurs 
The tourism entrepreneurs were a group of businessmen who were involved in the 
tourism industry in Kenya. All of them had owner interests in lodges or camps, while 
one of them also ran a travel agency and a tour company. Most of them are Kenyan 
citizens of European origin. 
 Jake Grieves-Cook is the most well-known of the tourism entrepreneurs who 
took part in the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy. Grieves-Cook is the owner 
of Porini camps and Gamewatchers safaris, and has just finished a term as chairman 
of Kenya Tourist Board. He had previously been involved in setting up the Selenkay 
Conservancy close to Amboseli National Park37. 
Interests 
The main interest of these tourism entrepreneurs in setting up Olare Orok 
Conservancy was to gain exclusive access to a prime wildlife viewing area. The 
boom in the tourism industry had caused an overcrowding of the MMNR and 
investors were looking to offer tourists a more exclusive experience. By establishing 
their own private conservation area they could tap into the very lucrative high-end of 
the tourism market. Setting up a private conservancy would also give them credit 
within the growing eco-tourism segment, which could lead to increasing market 
shares. 
 Another important motivation for the tourism entrepreneurs was to contribute 
to the conservation of the Mara ecosystem. Many tourism entrepreneurs feared that 
the subdivision of group ranches would lead to increased development of land and a 
                                              
37 See Rutten (2002) for a description of the establishment of Selenkay Conservancy. 
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loss of biodiversity. Setting up a wildlife conservancy could help protect wildlife on 
subdivided land.  
Tourism entrepreneurs were not taking part in conservation efforts only to 
provide a common good. Camp owners typically invest a lot of money in their 
product and tourists come to the Mara specifically to see the beautiful environment. If 
tourism entrepreneurs did not contribute to conservation efforts, the land around the 
MMNR would soon have more settlements and agricultural production, thus greatly 
deteriorating their tourism product.  
For the tourism entrepreneurs, the establishment of a conservancy was 
potentially associated with large start-up costs. The tourism entrepreneurs would have 
to spend considerable financial resources on negotiating with landowners, registering 
companies, building camps, hiring employees and marketing the tourism destination. 
However, they were already established in the tourism industry and did not have to 
start from scratch in these endeavours. 
 Due to the large start-up costs associated with the establishment of a 
conservancy, the tourism entrepreneurs had a strong interest in a stable and 
predictable operation of the conservancy. They had previously experienced the 
corruption and infighting of the wildlife trusts and associations. A camp operator 
could make an agreement with one wildlife association, only to find a few months 
later that it had split and that several other groups were demanding a share of the 
tourism revenue. It was crucial for the tourism entrepreneurs to avoid these kinds of 
problems in the management of the OOC. 
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Resources 
The tourism entrepreneurs controlled resources that made them crucial to a successful 
establishment of the conservancy38. This gave them a strong position in the process 
of setting up the conservancy.  
                                             
First, they controlled capital that could be invested in the construction of 
camps and infrastructure in the conservancy. There are significant start-up costs 
associated with setting up a private conservation area and it may take several years 
before the conservancy generates enough income to support its own operations. 
Second, the tourism entrepreneurs had broad experience with the formal 
procedures of establishing tourism businesses. Setting up a conservancy involves 
registering companies, drawing up contracts and leases and assessing funds from 
donors. These are tasks that require considerable experience with bureaucratic and 
legal procedures. 
Finally, they had access to domestic and international markets and could bring 
tourists to the conservancy. There are many wildlife tourism products in Kenya and 
attracting tourists to your destination requires good connections and an understanding 
of how to market your destination. Without visitors to the conservancy there would 
be no revenues to pay the landowners or the management of the OOC. 
v) Facilitators 
Two individuals played a crucial role as facilitators in the establishment of the 
conservancy. Ron Beaton is a Kenyan of British origin who has lived and worked in 
the Mara for over 30 years. He has previously owned and managed Rekero lodge, but 
recently retired and bought a parcel of land on Olare Orok. He spends his retirement 
developing various community projects, such as Koyiaki Guiding School (R. Beaton 
09.03.08 [Interview]). 
 
38 A UN study published in 2002 found that 80 % of community-based tourism initiatives collapsed within their first three 
years of operation, mainly due to lack of knowledge about management and marketing (L. Lindvik 10.03.08 [Interview]). 
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 Dickson Kaelo grew up on Lemek group ranch and is a former manager of 
Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust. He quit the wildlife trust and was employed by the 
International Livestock Research Institute in Nairobi as a community facilitator. His 
contract at ILRI ended during the process of establishing the OOC and towards the 
end of the process he was paid by the conservancy to facilitate the establishment 
process (D. Kaelo 06.03.08 [Interview]). 
Interests 
Kaelo and Beaton’s primary motivations to assist in the establishment of the 
conservancy were a combination of conservation and development reasons. They 
both saw the creation of wildlife conservancies on the group ranches around the 
MMNR as the best way to empower the local communities and preserve wildlife 
under private land tenure. The material benefits they received from aiding the local 
elites were very limited39 (J. Grieves-Cook 03.03.08, D. Rakwa 12.03.08, L. Lindvik 
10.03.08, and D. Kirokor 14.03.08 [Interviews]). 
Resources 
The two facilitators had a unique knowledge of the tourism business and the local 
communities. Beaton had the experience of running a tourist lodge and also had a 
wide network of contacts in the tourism business. Kaelo had previously been the 
manager of Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust and had an acute understanding of the 
politics of wildlife tourism on the group ranches. Together they had essential 
knowledge that could be used to design an appropriate institutional structure for the 
conservancy.  
 Beaton and Kaelo both had a lot of respect in the local community. In contrast 
to the local elites they were not benefiting directly from the establishment of the 
conservancy. Still they had a connection to the local community and were perceived 
as being on the side of the landowners in the negotiations with the tourism 
                                              
39 Beaton stood to receive a monthly rent of KES 10 000 (USD 140) from the conservancy, while Kaelo would be paid by 
the conservancy to facilitate the institutionalisation process (R. O’Meara 27.03.08 [Interview]). 
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entrepreneurs. Their “neutral” position meant that they could take the interests of 
different parties into account and that their advice was listened to.   
4.2.2 Alliance and Conflict 
In the bargaining over creating an institution, the stands taken by various actors are 
moulded by their private interests and the expectations they have about the behaviour 
of others (Libecap 1989:4). The different actors have incentives to seek as large a 
share of rents as possible under the new institutional arrangement and will try to 
establish structural arrangements that reinforce their power (Libecap 1989:11; Gibson 
1999:12). Actors create alliances with each other to further their own interests in the 
institutional creation process. 
 Below I analyse how actors with different interests and resources interacted in 
the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy and influenced the design of its 
institutions.  
The institutional creation process 
Local elites had the most to benefit from the creation of a wildlife conservancy on 
Olare Orok and were the leaders in the institutional creation process. They used their 
social status to convince the other landowners of the necessity to create a 
conservation area to benefit from wildlife tourism. The other landowners agreed as 
they found the establishment of a conservancy the best way to maximise the income 
from their land.  
 The local elites employed the resources of two facilitators in the process of 
establishing the wildlife conservancy. The two facilitators had a unique 
understanding of the tourism business and could strengthen the position of the elites 
vis-à-vis the tourism entrepreneurs. They also had a thorough knowledge of the 
politics of wildlife tourism in the community, and could help design a sustainable 
institutional structure. Finally, they occupied a more neutral position than the elites 
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and their recommendation could help bestow legitimacy upon the proposed 
institutions. 
 The facilitators put the local elites in contact with tourism entrepreneurs who 
wanted access to an exclusive wildlife viewing area. Together they created a business 
model for the OOC. The tourism entrepreneurs needed to be sure of the stability of 
the conservancy to invest large sums of money in its establishment. In order to secure 
long-term stability, they proposed an institutional structure where tourism 
entrepreneurs would lease the land from the landowners. They also proposed to 
establish a company to manage the conservancy and let an independent body handle 
the revenues to reduce corruption and mismanagement.  
The local elites supported most of the proposals, but were initially sceptic to 
the lease structure. However, the tourism entrepreneurs possessed crucial resources 
that were necessary to the establishment of the conservancy and the facilitators 
managed to convince the local elites that leasing out the land would be the best 
solution.  
 The business model of the OOC differed from previous institutional 
arrangements for wildlife tourism on the group ranches. Many of the older 
landowners did not understand the new model and were sceptic to change. The local 
elites approached the younger generation of landowners for support. The young 
landowners were eager to lease out their land and also hoping to benefit from 
employment opportunities if the conservancy was created. As they were educated, the 
young landowners understood the business model and could convince their older 
relatives of the advantages of the new model.  
 The landowners had two major costs that had to be overcome for the 
conservancy to be created. The first was the cost of removing their settlements from 
the proposed conservation area. This cost only applied to some of the landowners, as 
part of the conservancy was uninhabited. The costs were also mitigated by the fact 
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that most landowners had parcels of land in other parts of Koyiaki. Nevertheless, 
removing the settlements involved both labour efforts and the costs of transportation. 
 The local elites used both their wealth and their social status to make the other 
landowners move. They organised weekly meetings to tell the landowners about the 
importance of moving and organised free transport for the landowners and their 
possessions. Landowners were convinced to remove their settlements by this 
combination of social pressure and reduced transport costs. 
 A second major cost that had to be overcome to establish the OOC was the 
removal of cattle from the proposed conservation area. Landowners would still need a 
place to graze their cattle and had a major interest in continued access to the 
conservancy. These needs clashed with the interests of the tourism entrepreneurs to 
keep the conservancy as a pristine wildlife viewing area, free of people and cattle.  
The tourism entrepreneurs realised that finding a solution to livestock grazing 
was important to create support for the conservancy among the landowners. A 
compromise was reached in which the conservancy would serve as a “grass bank” 
and livestock grazing would be allowed during the tourism low season in November 
and December40. This solution satisfied the interests of both landowners and tourism 
entrepreneurs to a considerable extent. 
  The landowners were used to being cheated by politicians and leaders and did 
not want to sign on to permanent leases before they were sure that they would be paid 
their money. The tourism entrepreneurs realised that they needed to build the trust of 
the local community step by step, and for the first 18 months only a memorandum of 
understanding was signed. The first payments to the landowners were also made in 
cash so that they could see with their own eyes that the tourism entrepreneurs would 
                                              
40 This is also the time of the “yearly famine” when cattle have the most need for grazing land (D. Rakwa 12.03.08 
[Interview]). 
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keep their promises. Towards the end of the 18-month period a majority of the 
landowners signed on to 5-year leases. 
 A small group of young landowners had not signed on to the leases as they 
were dissatisfied with local elites receiving more benefits from the conservancy than 
other landowners. Some of them tried to have camps established on their land, but the 
agreement with the tourism entrepreneurs prevented the construction of more camps.  
This group of young landowners had little support from other actors in their 
discontent with the local elites. The tourism entrepreneurs did not want any 
competing camps to be established in the reserve and supported the local elites. 
Ordinary landowners were satisfied with the revenues they received from the 
conservancy and thankful to the local elites for establishing it.  
Lacking the support to change revenue distribution within the conservancy, ten 
young landowners pulled out of the OOC and created their own trust to benefit from 
wildlife tourism. However, the recent crisis in the Kenyan tourism industry has dried 
up their incomes and four of them have recently rejoined the conservancy. 
Explaining the successful establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy  
Scholars describe the establishment of social institutions as conflictual and this is also 
the experience from the establishment of wildlife trusts and associations in the Mara. 
Yet, there were relatively few conflicts associated with the establishment of Olare 
Orok Conservancy. What explains this apparently harmonious process of institutional 
creation? The answers can be found in three factors: land tenure, leadership and a 
homogenous local community. 
 One major difference between Olare Orok Conservancy and other attempts at 
institutional creation in the Mara is land tenure. Landowners on Olare Orok were 
empowered by their ownership to land and could pull out of the proposed 
conservancy if they were not satisfied with the conditions. Local elites depended on 
their cooperation and were forced to take their interests into account when 
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establishing the conservancy. This led to a more equal distribution of revenues from 
the conservancy and less conflicts between the different actors. 
 A second factor that simplified the establishment of the conservancy was the 
homogenous character of the group of landowners. A less diverse group is less 
subject to internal conflicts that can complicate collective action (Baland & Platteau 
1996:300).  
In terms of cultural homogeneity all the landowners on Olare Orok belonged 
to the same sub-clan of the il-Purko Maasai. In a vertically organised society like 
Kenya, where individuals depend on their lineage and clan for support, belonging to 
the same sub-clan increased the trust they had in each other. Landowners also 
enjoyed a high degree of homogeneity in terms of interests. They all wanted to 
maximise the return from their land by establishing a wildlife conservancy, none of 
them wanted to use their land for other purposes. 
In terms of individual endowments the group of landowners was more 
heterogeneous. Most landowners were poor, while a few members of the elite 
controlled substantial economic resources. However, economic inequality is not 
necessarily an obstacle to collective action. As long as the elite shares the interests of 
other group members, heterogeneity of resources can be an advantage as the rich can 
assume a leadership role in the establishment of institutions (Baland & Platteau 
1996:306). This was clearly the case on Olare Orok. Sayielel and other members of 
the elite who controlled prime areas of land had a stronger interest in establishing the 
conservancy than other landowners, and were motivated to pay a major share of the 
costs associated with its creation. 
Good leadership was a third factor that eased the formation of the OOC. Good 
leaders are necessary to perform a number of crucial functions and successful 
collective action is often associated with effective, charismatic local leadership 
(Baland & Platteau 1996:337; Ostrom 1990:198). In the case of Olare Orok the 
leadership role was filled by an older respected community leader in cooperation with 
two facilitators who were educated and exposed to the outside world. According to 
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Baland and Platteau (1996:342), such a combination of traditional authority and 
external exposure and education presents an “ideal case” of leadership when 
undertaking collective action in rural areas of the developing world. 
4.2.3 Summary 
Four main groups of actors influenced the creation of Olare Orok Conservancy: local 
elites, tourism entrepreneurs, young landowners and ordinary landowners. Two 
facilitators also played a central role in establishing the conservancy. 
 The landowners and the local elites shared an interest in maximising the return 
from their land through establishing a wildlife conservancy. Tourism entrepreneurs 
were motivated to create the OOC by the opportunity to gain access to an exclusive 
wildlife viewing area. With regards to institutional design, tourism entrepreneurs 
needed assurance of the long-term stability of the conservancy, while landowners had 
a strong interest in continued access to graze their cattle within the conservancy.    
 Local elites had material resources, information and social status that allowed 
them to facilitate the creation of Olare Orok Conservancy. While many of the 
ordinary landowners were illiterate, their ownership to land was a crucial resource in 
the institutional creation process. The tourism entrepreneurs had broad experience 
from the tourism industry and access to financial capital and international markets. 
These resources were invaluable in the creation of the OOC.  
 Local elites had the most to benefit from the establishment of Olare Orok 
Conservancy and took a leadership role in its creation. They employed two 
facilitators to help set up the conservancy and allied with the younger landowners to 
convince older landowners to join the conservancy. 
     A group of young landowners were dissatisfied with the distribution of 
revenues in OOC. They found little support among other actors and decided to pull 
out and create their own conservancy. However, the post-election violence in Kenya 
in 2008 dried up their incomes and four of them have returned to the OOC. 
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 While previous attempts at institutional creation in the Mara have been 
conflictual, the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy has been a relatively 
harmonious affair. A homogenous local community, the presence of effective 
leadership and the empowering impact of individual land tenure explains this absence 
of conflict.   
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5. Conclusion 
It was widely expected that subdivision of group ranches in the Mara would lead 
individual landowners to develop their land, thus causing a decline in wildlife 
populations. Contrary to these expectations, landowners on Olare Orok decided to 
pool their land together and establish a wildlife conservancy.  
 This thesis seeks to explain why a wildlife conservancy was established on 
Olare Orok. More specifically, it identifies how actors with different interests and 
resources interact to establish the conservancy and how the institutional setting 
influences the interaction among actors. 
 The first chapter introduced the research questions and described how the 
study would be carried out. I chose to use a case study design as it allows me to study 
institutional development in detail and identified interviews with key actors and 
existing literature as main data sources to describe institutional development in the 
Mara. 
 The theoretical framework that guides the data analysis was introduced in the 
second chapter. I chose to utilise rational choice institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism to explain the establishment of the OOC as these two versions of new 
institutionalism complement each other. Taken together they recognise how 
individuals consciously design institutions and are influenced by the institutional 
setting in this process.  
Path dependence and contracting are two central concepts in the analytical 
framework I employ to analyse the creation of the OOC. Path dependence illustrates 
how historical events may create institutional paths in the Mara that are sustained due 
to self-reinforcing processes. Contracting refers to how individual actors with 
different interests and resources may negotiate with each other to establish collective 
institutions. 
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 The third chapter described the institutional setting in the Mara after 
independence and the process of establishing Olare Orok Conservancy. In the 
description of the institutional setting I focus on wildlife policy and land tenure, two 
crucial issues in understanding institutional development in the Mara. My account of 
the creation of the OOC describes how actors with different interests and resources 
came together to establish the conservancy.    
In the fourth chapter I analysed how changes in wildlife policy and land tenure 
affected institutional options in the community. I also investigated how actors with 
different resources and interests allied with each other to further their interests in the 
creation of the conservancy. The main findings of this chapter can be found below. 
5.1 Main Findings 
Olare Orok Conservancy was created because landowners and tourism entrepreneurs 
saw an opportunity to profit, because they had the necessary resources to establish the 
conservancy and because the institutional setting provided an opportunity for change. 
 The OOC was created because landowners and tourism entrepreneurs 
benefited from its establishment. Tourism entrepreneurs wanted access to an 
exclusive wildlife viewing area to avoid the overcrowding of the MMNR. By 
offering their clients exclusive safari experiences they could generate significant 
profits. Landowners could derive a higher rent from leasing out their land to a 
wildlife conservancy than by using it for agricultural production or livestock grazing. 
Local elites benefited most from the conservancy as their land parcels were larger or 
located on sites that were suitable for tourism facilities. 
 Furthermore, the institutional design of the conservancy secured the interests 
of different actors. Landowners were allowed to continue grazing their cattle inside 
the conservancy during the tourism low-season. Tourism entrepreneurs were secured 
long-term stability for their investment by leasing the conservancy for a 5-year 
period. Professional management of the conservancy and independent handling of 
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revenues ensured that ordinary landowners were not cheated and reduced the 
potential for conflicts.  
 Landowners and tourism entrepreneurs possessed the resources that were 
necessary to establish the conservancy. First, the local elites provided essential 
leadership resources that eased the process of collective action. Traditional leaders 
allied with younger, educated community members providing an “ideal case” of 
effective leadership. Second, the community had a social capital that could be used as 
a foundation to establish the OOC. Landowners on Olare Orok were a homogenous 
group that belonged to the same Maasai sub-clan and had the same interest of 
maximising the income from their land. Finally, the tourism entrepreneurs provided 
invaluable resources in form of business experience and access to capital and 
international markets. Without these resources the OOC might have died within its 
first years of operation, like many other eco-tourism initiatives do.  
The Maasai had previously been excluded from wildlife revenues, but changes 
in wildlife policy and land tenure in the Mara opened new institutional options for 
Maasai landowners to benefit. Community conservation policies introduced by the 
KWS in the early 1990s gave legitimacy to the local population’s claim to a share of 
tourism revenues. It empowered the group ranches to challenge Narok County 
Council and demand a share of revenues from the MMNR. The subsequent 
subdivision of group ranches in the Mara empowered ordinary landowners and gave 
them greater control over the use of their land. Local elites were consequently forced 
to consider the interests of ordinary landowners in establishing social institutions. 
5.2 The Road Ahead 
My analysis of the establishment of Olare Orok Conservancy demonstrates that it is 
necessary to investigate both the role of actors in the community and more long-term 
historical processes to understand institutional development and change. The OOC 
was created because landowners expected to benefit from it. However, its 
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establishment would have failed without the new power structure in the community, 
caused by changing wildlife policy and land tenure. Analysing the creation of the 
OOC from a pure rational choice perspective would have made me overlook 
important explanatory factors.  
 The impact of the present tourism crisis on institutional development in the 
Mara further illustrates the need to apply a historical perspective in institutional 
analysis. Most landowners in the Mara have lost their income from wildlife tourism, 
but landowners on Olare Orok are still guaranteed a monthly income as they lease out 
their land to tourism entrepreneurs. The loss of tourism revenue is a powerful 
incentive for institutional change. In a belt surrounding the MMNR landowners are 
currently attempting to establish wildlife conservancies after the model of the OOC 
(D. Kaelo 07.03.08, L. Lindvik 10.03.08 and R. O’Meara 27.03.08 [Interviews]). The 
success of the OOC has created an institutional path that dominates the way Maasai 
landowners organise to benefit from wildlife revenues in the Mara.  
 My findings about the establishment of the OOC could help landowners, 
tourism entrepreneurs and conservation NGOs in their efforts to set up more wildlife 
conservancies in the Mara. It could also contribute to the wider debate about wildlife 
conservation and economic development in the areas surrounding national parks and 
reserves in Africa. 
More research is needed about how landowners in the Mara organise 
themselves politically, economically and socially after the subdivision of group 
ranches. One issues of special interest is how local and national actors interact to 
create new institutions. Further studies should not only investigate the interests and 
resources of these actors, but also take into account how historical processes 
determine which institutional options are available. 
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Annex 1: List of Informants 
 Name Position Location Date 
1 Mohamed Said Scientist, ILRI Nairobi 27.02.08 
2 Joseph Ogutu Scientist, ILRI Nairobi 27.02.08 
3 Jake Grieves-
Cook 
Owner Porini group, owner 
Gamewatchers safaris, former chairman 
Kenya Tourist Board 
Nairobi 03.03.08 
4 Dickson Kaelo Community facilitator OOC, former 
manager Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust, 




5 Johnson Sipitiek Project Liaison Officer, African 
Conservation Centre (ACC) 
Narok town 07.03.08 
6 Stephen Kisotu Community Scout Coordinator, Friends 
of Conservation 
Narok town 07.03.08 
7 John Siololo Landowner OOC, driver guide Porini 
Camps 
Narok town 07.03.08 
8 Billy Kuyo Former secretary, Siana Wildlife Trust Narok town 08.03.08 
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Annex 2: Returns to agriculture, livestock and 




Source: Norton-Griffiths 2007:45, Figure 3. 
 
